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The deterrence of copyright infringement and the evils of piracy have long 
been an axiomatic focus of both legislators and scholars. The conventional 
view is that infringement must be curbed and/or punished in order for 
copyright to fulfill its purported goals of incentivizing creation and ensuring 
access to works. This Essay proves this view false by demonstrating that 
some rightsholders don’t merely tolerate, but actually encourage 
infringement, both explicitly and implicitly, in a variety of different 
situations and for one common reason: they benefit from it. Rightsholders’ 
ability to monetize infringement destabilizes long-held but problematic 
assumptions about both rightsholder preferences, and about copyright’s 
optimal infringement policy.  
Through a series of case studies, this Essay describes the impetuses and 
normative implications of this counterintuitive — but not so unusual — 
phenomenon. Recognition of monetized infringement in copyright is 
interesting not only for its unexpectedness, but also for the broader point 
that its existence suggests: we have an impoverished descriptive account of 
why some laws operate the way that they do. This is particularly unsettling 
in an area like copyright, where advocates are sharply divided along policy 
lines. This Essay is an important first step toward a positive theory of 
copyright — one that recognizes the underappreciated role, both positive 
and negative, that private parties play in policymaking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Stephanie Lenz filmed her toddler dancing in the kitchen with 
Prince’s hit song “Let’s Go Crazy” playing in the background and posted 
it to YouTube,1 copyright owner Universal Music issued a takedown 
notice alleging infringement.2 In response, Lenz claimed fair use, and 
the parties ended up in court for eight years.3 When a fan posted a 
homemade video of a young boy dancing to an Aphex Twin song to 
YouTube, copyright owner Warp Records declined to issue a takedown 
notice, and instead tweeted the video out from its own Twitter account: 
 
As of this writing, the video has over 250,000 views.4  
Both of these instances involve a user uploading a video that uses a 
copyrighted work without prior permission. In the former case, 
rightsholder Universal Music took the (ultimately unsuccessful) 
position that the upload amounted to infringement, and sought to 
enforce their copyright under the statute.5 In the latter case, 
rightsholder Warp Records not only declined to enforce its copyright 
 
 1 Stephanie Lenz, “Let’s Go Crazy” #1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1KfJHFWlhQ [https://perma.cc/G73N-KBEY]. 
 2 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 3 See Copyright Law — Digital Millennium Copyright Act — Ninth Circuit Requires 
Analysis of Fair Use Before Issuing of Takedown Notices. — Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp., No. 13-16106, 2016 WL 1056082 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 
id., 129 HARV. L. REV. 2289, 2289-93 (2016) [hereinafter Recent Case, Lenz v. Universal 
Music Corp.], for a concise and comprehensive summary of the litigation. 
 4 See Ryan Wyer, Aphex Twin – Minipops 67 [120.2][Source Field Mix], YOUTUBE 
(Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wm1XwkOHxx8&list=PLK3ot 
LXbk_p1EJD0pse0mcqrRNrOeeZ3P&index=3&t=0s [https://perma.cc/94GQ-WUDN]. 
 5 See Recent Case, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., supra note 3, at 2290-91. 
  
268 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:265 
against the YouTube user, but also actively publicized the video, thereby 
significantly increasing its views (and with it, both the song and the 
user’s popularity).  
Warp’s response is unexpected not least of all because the 
conventional view is that infringement — often including fair uses, until 
shown definitively to be the case — must be curbed and/or punished 
(often severely) in order for copyright to fulfill its purported goals of 
incentivizing creation and ensuring access to creative works. This view 
is so firmly and widely held that all three branches of intellectual 
property — copyright, patent, and trademark — operate under a strict 
liability standard for infringement.6 In other words, if infringement is 
found, the infringer is liable regardless of whether they intended to 
infringe, or even whether they were aware they had. In addition, 
copyright allows rightsholders whose work is infringed to opt for 
 
 6 In copyright, see, for example, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure 
of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1682 (2012), 
concluding that in the case of copyright infringement it “makes little difference for 
liability whether the copying was intentional, negligent, or a genuine mistake;” Dane S. 
Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 
351, 356 (2002), noting that infringement in copyright does not require “scienter, intent, 
knowledge, negligence, or similar culpable mental state. On the contrary, liability for 
civil copyright infringement is strict.” But cf. Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement 
a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305 (2015) (questioning the conventional 
view and suggesting that infringement liability acts more like a fault-based tort).  
In trademark, see, for example, Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark 
Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2109 (2004), calling trademark infringement a strict 
liability tort; Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and 
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1310 (2011), finding that courts have 
long interpreted trademark as a strict liability offense. But cf. Alfred C. Yen, Intent and 
Trademark Infringement, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 713 (2015) (arguing that the conventional 
view of intent in trademark is flawed). 
In patent, see, for example, Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its 
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800-01 (2002), “Patent 
infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that a defendant may be liable without 
having had any notice, prior to the filing of an infringement action, that her conduct 
was infringing. In other words, innocent (i.e., unintentional or inadvertent) 
infringement is not a defense to a patent infringement claim, and a court usually will 
enjoin the defendant from infringing even though she was put on notice only by the 
filing of the lawsuit.” (citations omitted); Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for 
Absolute Infringement in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2016), “It is irrelevant 
under current law whether the defendant actually copied the patentee’s technology, let 
alone whether it intentionally, recklessly, negligently or inadvertently copied the 
patentee’s technology. Put simply, patent infringement is an absolute liability regime.” 
But cf. Patrick R. Goold, Patent Accidents: Questioning Strict Liability in Patent Law, 95 
IND. L.J. 1075 (2020) (questioning the propriety of a strict liability standard in the 
context of accidental patent infringement). 
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recovery of statutory damages, regardless of actual harm.7 In sum, 
copyright infringement has long been painted as the enemy of cultural 
production and human flourishing, and its deterrence has long been a 
primary focus of both popular and scholarly inquiry.8  
Some copyright infringement is committed innocently — there are 
only so many musical notes, for example, and it is not uncommon for 
similar chords to be used in songs of the same genre.9 Other instances 
of infringement might be described as malicious, or at least as recklessly 
indifferent. For example, self-styled “appropriation artist” Richard 
Prince was sued for copying photographs from several people’s 
Instagram feeds, adding a nonsense comment, then selling screenshots 
of the photos without sharing profits with the photographers, nor even 
offering them attribution.10  
Predictably, most copyright infringement falls in the gray area 
between these extremes; for example, George Harrison’s “subconscious 
 
 7 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018). This can lead to steep damage awards, even in 
cases of innocent infringement. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, 
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 439, 441 (2009) (“Awards of statutory damages are frequently arbitrary, 
inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1025, 1065-66 (2016) (defining the principle of equitable allocation as “the risk of 
copyright infringement should be allocated in a way that is conducive to robust 
opportunities for cultural creation widely dispersed among all members of society. Self-
determination has a stake in such broad distribution of creative opportunities because 
being able to live creative lives either as professionals or amateurs is likely to be central 
to the fundamental life path choices of some individuals”) (citations omitted); J. Janewa 
Osei-Tutu, Using Intellectual Property Law to Promote Human Flourishing for “Market 
Women,” AM. BAR ASS’N (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_ 
property_law/publications/landslide/2017-18/march-april/using-intellectual-property-
law-promote-human-flourishing-market-women/ [https://perma.cc/5AWA-YM8P] 
(claiming, in the context of female entrepreneurship, that “IP laws can be used as a tool 
for promoting human flourishing and human development”). 
 9 See, e.g., Sir Mashalot, Sir Mashalot: Mind-Blowing SIX Song Country Mashup, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FY8SwIvxj8o 
[https://perma.cc/J5EX-UQ73] (featuring six different country music songs that are 
effectively indistinguishable); Mike Shear, 5 Most Popular and Common Guitar Chord 
Progressions for Song Writers, UBERCHORD (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.uberchord. 
com/blog/5-popular-common-guitar-chord-progressions-song-writers/ [https://perma. 
cc/LKJ6-K9VB] (explaining how the chord progression I-iV-V7 is used in many popular 
songs, from Richie Valens’s La Bamba to The Beatles’s Twist and Shout to The Ting Ting’s 
That’s Not My Name). 
 10 See Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366, 371-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see also 
Andrew R. Chow, Copyright Case over Richard Prince Instagram Show to Go Forward, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/arts/design/richard-
prince-instagram-copyright-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/NJ7J-VCYV].  
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copying” of The Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine” in his song “My Sweet Lord.” 
The Chiffon’s topped the charts with their song “He’s So Fine” in 
1963.11 George Harrison released his album All Things Must Pass, 
containing the lead single “My Sweet Lord” in 1970.12 Listeners 
everywhere noticed the similarity, including Harrison himself: “I wasn’t 
consciously aware of the similarity when I wrote the song . . . But once 
it started to get a lot of airplay, people started talking about it, and it 
was then I thought, ‘Why didn’t I realize?’”13 Ultimately, Harrison was 
found guilty of “subconscious copying” — a step down from willful 
infringement — and ordered to pay copyright owner Bright Tunes $1.5 
million.14  
This Essay destabilizes long-held but problematic assumptions about 
the interplay between copyright law’s purported goals and its treatment 
of infringement by challenging the received wisdom that rightsholders 
are necessarily anti-infringement. Specifically, I argue that some 
rightsholders don’t just tolerate — but actively monetize — 
infringement,15 both explicitly and implicitly, in a variety of different 
situations and for one common reason: it benefits them. By the 
conventional account, this is an astounding result: Copyright affords 
rightsholders a powerful statute against infringement, strict liability, 
high damages, and powerfully consolidated industry interests — and 
still, some rightsholders explicitly decline the statutory protection in 
 
 11 The Chiffons He’s So Fine, ALLMUSIC, https://www.allmusic.com/song/hes-so-fine-
mt0003113623 (last visited July 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K6P5-3SEW]. 
 12 George Harrison All Things Must Pass, ALLMUSIC, https://www.allmusic.com/ 
album/all-things-must-pass-mw0000194979 (last visited July 6, 2020) [https://perma. 
cc/3GYM-VZR8]. 
 13 Lydia Hutchinson, George Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord” Copyright Case, 
PERFORMING SONGWRITER BE HEARD (Feb. 10, 2015), http://performingsongwriter.com/ 
george-harrison-my-sweet-lord/ [https://perma.cc/3ZPG-95GK].  
 14 See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 15 While some of the examples described herein might also be described as 
“unauthorized copying,” I use “infringement” to more accurately describe the positive 
state of affairs wherein a rightsholder might forego enforcement of their rights today, 
but enforce them tomorrow, or enforce them selectively against some defendants and 
not others. It might alternately be suggested that “monetized infringement” effectively 
amounts to a gratis, ex-post license such that its monetization renders it no longer 
infringing. The ex-post nature of this monetization, its uneven application, and its 
concomitant unpredictability, however, prevent monetized infringement from 
functioning in any meaningful way like a proper license. Instead, rightsholders who 
intend to grant gratis licenses for their work can do so en masse via means such as 
Creative Commons. For a list of license types and their descriptions, see About the 
Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited July 6, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/6W6P-BXWX]. 
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favor of monetization. What does this tell us about the underlying 
statute?  
Copyright law’s one-size-fits-all statutory licenses are notoriously ill-
tailored, such that these licenses often serves as penalty defaults.16 In 
the copyright context, a “penalty default license” has been defined as 
“the use of bounded uncertainty to induce private ordering.”17 By 
setting a one-size-fits-all statutory rate that fluctuates every five years, 
copyright has built uncertainty into its statutory licenses.18 This 
unpredictability makes copyright an ideal case study in how some 
rightsholders have improved tailoring by refraining from enforcing their 
statutory rights. As with other forms of private ordering, the 
government’s role in private enforcement forbearance is to set the 
statutory default.19 
This Essay is about copyright owners monetizing copyright 
infringement, and does not make any claims regarding the overall 
efficiency of such infringement. The potential for efficient and/or 
 
 16 For a fuller description of this phenomenon, see infra Part III.A.2. 
 17 Kristelia García, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1117, 1122 (2014) [hereinafter Penalty Default] (citations omitted). 
 18 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 804(b)(1) (2018) (describing the process by which statutory 
rates are set and changed every five years). 
 19 See infra Part III.C. 
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beneficial infringement has been written about extensively, both in the 
copyright context20 and elsewhere in intellectual property (“IP”).21  
This Essay recognizes that infringement may or may not be efficient, 
or socially beneficial, or even desirable. In all of these cases, articulating 
a theory of monetized infringement is nonetheless valuable for several 
reasons. First, it brings balance to a popular account of rightsholders as 
anti-infringement, when in practice they are more of a mixed bag. At 
the very least, it calls into question the universality of the assumption 
that copyrights must be enforced or incentives will fail.  
Moreover, recognition of monetized infringement in copyright is 
interesting not only for its unexpectedness, but also for the broader 
point that its existence suggests: we have an impoverished descriptive 
account of why some laws operate the way that they do. This is 
particularly unsettling in an area like copyright, where advocates are 
sharply divided along policy lines.22 These divisions tend to have a 
 
 20 See, e.g., EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW 
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 169-82 (Yale Univ. 
Press 2010) (discussing potentially socially productive “copyright disobedience”). For 
a detailed account of the potential social value of some copyright infringement, see, for 
example, David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1794 
(2013), “In a nontrivial number of instances, violating copyright law - like violating 
other laws - can serve socially beneficial ends. The exposure of a company’s fraudulent 
practices may necessarily entail unauthorized publication of their copyright-protected 
internal communications. Infringement may also lead to public dissemination of 
culturally enriching materials kept under wraps by owners who want to suppress their 
dissemination. Outsider artists may trade on the illegality of their appropriation of 
others’ works as a constituent feature of their own creation, requiring infringement to 
create their work. Infringement also creates social welfare where it simply enables 
beneficial uses that would not have happened otherwise, such as where the mere act of 
acquiring permission for a use proves prohibitively costly in comparison to its 
internalized value. And even owners may benefit from unauthorized copying of their 
works, such as where the copies serve as a powerful advertisement for the owner’s 
brand.”; Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech 
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 587 (2004), suggesting that some 
infringement may be protected: “Courts should recognize that various kinds of copying 
. . . promote free speech. . . . The point is not to denigrate fair use, but to recognize that 
many kinds of uses of copyrighted material may be justified . . . .”; see also infra Part 
I.A.3.c. 
 21 See, e.g., Kai Yi Xie, Comment, Improving the Patent System by Encouraging 
Intentional Infringement: The Beneficial Use Standard of Patents, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 
1023 (2017) (arguing that “it is sometimes socially desirable to encourage patent 
infringement,” and so proposing that “the government should act to encourage it in 
instances where the benefits of infringement outweigh the costs of enforcement”). 
 22 Compare, for example, this excerpt on creative innovation from the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation: “A few media or political interests shouldn’t have unfair 
technological or legal advantages over the rest of us. Unfortunately, litigious copyright 
and patent owners can abuse the law to inhibit fair use and stifle competition. Internet 
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disproportionate, negative impact on less established artists, 
intermediaries with fewer resources, and traditionally marginalized 
communities.23  
More broadly, a theory of monetized infringement reveals the 
underappreciated role that private parties play in policymaking. For 
example, copyright says that — with the exception of fair use — the 
upload of a video containing unlicensed music constitutes infringement 
and is punishable by law. Under the auspices of YouTube’s private 
fingerprinting technology Content ID, in contrast, many copyright 
owners effectively say that the unauthorized upload of a video 
containing unlicensed music will not be removed so long as related ad 
revenues are relinquished; i.e., so long as they can monetize the potential 
infringement (or fair use, as the case may be). Which view describes the 
current state of the law? If both — such that the answer is “it depends” 
— the user’s conundrum is easy to identify.  
Monetized infringement shares some features with, yet is notably 
different from, the sort of “tolerated uses” identified by Tim Wu: 
“Tolerated use is infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the 
owner may be aware, yet does nothing about.”24 The examples in Part 
I.B infra go further than toleration to actively monetize infringement, 
which begs the question of whether monetized infringement is 
infringement at all? As explained herein, I believe the answer is yes, 
since there currently exists no mechanism preventing a rightsholder 
from selectively and alternately monetizing, and enforcing against, 
infringement. This is not the case, for example, under a Creative 
Commons license, which affords an in rem — and not an in personam 
— right to use. A rightsholder might tolerate, for example, the 
unauthorized use of its photograph on a small town church’s fall festival 
flyer because infringement suits are costly and there is little to be gained 
 
service providers can give established content companies an advantage over startups 
and veto the choices you make in how to use the Internet.” Creativity and Innovation, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/innovation (last visited 
July 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/MD4L-T7SR], with that of Creative Futures: “Powerful 
internet platforms have spent millions promoting the message that copyright ‘stifles 
creativity and innovation.’ They argue that the legal framework that supports your work 
is in their way. It has advanced this false claim on social media and blogs, in the 
mainstream press, in academia, and in testimony before Congress for years.” Innovation, 
CREATIVEFUTURE, https://creativefuture.org/why-this-matters/whosstifling-innovation/ 
(last visited July 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/73GS-XRL5].  
 23 See Kristelia A. García & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term, 
71 ALA. L. REV. 351, 403-04 (discussing disproportionate impacts of copyright policy 
on these groups). 
 24 Tim Wu, Tolerated Use 3 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 333, 
2008). 
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from succeeding in this instance. This is substantively different from 
encouraging local congregations to make unauthorized use of 
copyrighted photos because the rightsholders will in turn receive 
valuable promotion that they could not otherwise access.  
Private policymaking via nonenforcement raises a set of questions 
distinct from those traditionally associated with governmental and 
administrative forbearance: What role does the government play? 
Should we be more concerned about private forbearance abuses than we 
are in the case of governmental forbearance? Can private forbearance 
amount to unilateral policymaking? To an abdication of Congress’ will?  
This Essay grapples with these, and other, questions as follows: 
Through a series of contemporary examples, Part I compares and 
contrasts the traditional view of infringement with that of monetized 
infringement. Part II discusses some of the most likely impetuses for the 
monetization of infringement. Part III details the normative 
implications of monetizing infringement, and briefly considers the 
government’s role in private policymaking through nonenforcement.  
I. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
The law frequently assumes an exogenous preference for a particular 
outcome or result. Residential parking restrictions, for example, assume 
that residents want to park a vehicle in front of their homes. In reality, 
some residents have an endogenous preference to rent or sell their 
parking space, and/or prefer to ride their bike or to take public 
transportation instead.25 Similarly, copyright law assumes a preference 
on the part of rightsholders that their work not be infringed. This Part 
uses copyright law as a case study to demonstrate that this preference 
does not hold across all rightsholders, some of whom instead monetize 
infringement, or permission-less use, in varying circumstances and for 
various reasons.  
A. The Infringement Problem 
The conventional view of copyright infringement is as something to 
be deterred wherever possible, and punished (often harshly) otherwise. 
Indeed, with the exception of fair use — determined in Lenz v. Universal 
to be a complete (and not an affirmative) defense to copyright 
 
 25 See, e.g., Mary Meisenzahl, A Parking Space in a Garage in San Francisco is Selling 
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infringement26 — copyright advocates are generally in agreement that 
“protection of [artists’] copyrights is crucial to their ability to earn a 
living,” and that infringement “threatens to destroy the ability of 
[artists] to sustain themselves economically through the creation and 
authorized exploitation of their [ ] works, and does irreparable, 
nationwide harm to the ability of creators to protect the quality 
and artistic integrity of their works.”27 
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress with the authority to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”28 This is presumed to be the 
impetus behind the enactment and enforcement of U.S. copyright law. 
Copyright’s purported policy goals of both incentivizing creation, and 
ensuring access to copyrighted works, is often referred to as the 
“incentive-access paradigm.”29  
The incentive theory of copyright holds that if artists are denied the 
fruit of their labor, they will eventually cease to produce new works and 
society will thereby be impoverished.30 There has been some debate in 
the literature as to the strength and veracity of this idea in practice. On 
the one hand, James Madison makes the case that “[t]he public good 
fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”31 On the other hand, 
some commentators have observed that creators may be motivated by 
factors other than financial incentives, including personal satisfaction 
and self-expression.32 
 
 26 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 27 Brief for Nat’l Acad. of Recording Arts & Scis., et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at *5, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 218022. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 29 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 485 (1996) (describing the paradigm by asserting that 
“[b]roadening the scope of copyright increases the incentive to produce works of 
authorship and results in a greater variety of such works. Broadening copyright’s scope, 
however, also limits access to such works both generally, by increasing their price, and 
specifically, by limiting the material that others can use to create additional works. 
Given these competing considerations, defining copyright’s proper scope has become a 
matter of balancing the benefits of broader protection, in the form of increased incentive 
to produce such works, against its costs, in the form of lost access to such works”). 
 30 See id. 
 31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 32 See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of 
Copyright Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2434-35 (2016) (observing that “[t]he 
past decade has seen a flood of legal scholarship . . . challeng[ing] the assumption that 
money plays much of a role at all in motivating artistic production, suggesting instead 
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In any event, this Essay does not take issue with the incentive theory, 
which it takes at face value, but rather with its extension — namely, 
that infringement disincentivizes creators by denying them the ability to 
extract value from their works. Instead, I argue that it may, or it may not. 
I do not aim herein to determine whether infringement is “good” or 
“bad” (nor for whom), but rather whether — as the law assumes — 
rightsholders are necessarily harmed by infringement. I argue that 
sometimes they are, but sometimes they aren’t. In other words, it’s not 
just that some rightsholders forbear from enforcing their rights (some 
do), but rather that some actually monetize the trespass as a means of 
creating value. Before turning to specific examples of this in Part I.B., 
the following sections describe the current state of the statutory law, the 
case law, and the scholarly literature, as they relate to copyright 
infringement.  
1. Statutory & Legislative Background 
Section 501 of the Copyright Act defines an infringer as “[a]nyone 
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as 
provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in 
section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the 
United States in violation of section 602[.]”33 Where the owner of a 
valid copyright believes they have been infringed, they are “entitled, 
subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any 
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the 
owner of it.”34  
 
that the desire for subcultural status or the intrinsic enjoyment of the creative process 
are stronger drivers of creative production. Other research has shown that factors 
foreign to U.S. law, like the desire for attribution, play a persistent role in authors’ 
incentives”) (citations omitted); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and 
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 82 (1998) (describing 
“three identifiably separate personhood interests in an intellectual property res: (1) 
creativity; (2) intentionality; and (3) identification as the source of the res”) (citations 
omitted); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension 
of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1947 (2006) (highlighting the 
“spiritual or inspirational motivations that are inherent in the creative task itself as 
opposed to motivation resulting from the possibility of economic reward”). 
 33 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2018). 
 34 Id. § 501(b). 
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Remedies available to rightsholders include injunction,35 
impounding,36 monetary damages,37 attorneys costs,38 and, in some 
cases, criminal penalties.39 Monetary damages may be awarded as actual 
damages or as statutory damages.40 Statutory damages range from $750 
to $30,000 per work infringed, increasing to as much as $150,000 in 
cases of willful infringement.41  
Copyright infringement is generally understood to be a strict liability 
tort: 42 “Copyright infringement is a strict liability wrong in the sense 
that a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability in order to 
prevail.”43 The Supreme Court has affirmed this view: “[i]ntention to 
infringe is not essential under the [Copyright] Act.”44 As Tony Reese 
explains:  
[E]arlier statutes expressly made sales of unauthorized copies 
infringing only if made with knowledge that the copies were 
unauthorized; also, for many kinds of works, infringement by 
imitation was penalized only if the defendant had intended to 
evade the law. By contrast, the 1909 Act merely enumerated the 
exclusive rights to which a copyright owner was entitled but 
never expressly defined infringement and articulated no 
knowledge or mental-state requirement for any violations. The 
express limitations of earlier U.S. copyright statutes as to sales 
and derivative works thus disappeared from U.S. copyright law 
upon the enactment of the 1909 Act . . . The 1976 Act [under 
which we currently operate] maintained the same approach, 
including essentially no mental-state limits on liability for direct 
infringement.45  
Some scholars have been critical of this standard — for example, Ben 
Depoorter and Robert Kirk Walker have noted that “[e]ven for affluent 
defendants, overcoming the Copyright Act’s strict liability standard is 
 
 35 Id. § 502. 
 36 Id. § 503.  
 37 Id. § 504. 
 38 Id. § 505.  
 39 Id. § 506.  
 40 Id. § 504(a).  
 41 Id. § 504(c).  
 42 See supra note 6.  
 43 Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 44 Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931).  
 45 R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 179 (2007). 
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highly burdensome.”46 Nonetheless, liability for “innocent infringers” 
appears to be an intentional feature — and not a bug — of the current 
system. According to a 1958 report of the Copyright Office:  
The general features of the law of innocent infringement were 
shaped prior to 1909. Except for the innocent vendor, 
innocence or lack of intent to infringe was not generally a 
defense to an action for infringement. There is considerable 
evidence that this situation was realized by those participating 
in the drafting and enactment of the 1909 act; although the 
problem of the innocent infringer was considered at some 
length in the hearings, the 1909 statute contained no broad 
provisions excusing innocent infringers. Moreover, the act 
eliminated the provision in earlier statutes expressly protecting 
the innocent seller.47  
Of course, the threat of high statutory damages serves not only to 
punish, but also to deter, copyright infringement — and sometimes to 
deter potential fair uses. The problem, as described by Pamela 
Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, is that “[a]wards of statutory damages 
are frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes 
grossly excessive.”48 This is especially true in the digital age: “There is 
a growing understanding that statutory damage awards . . . are a poor 
fit for the digital age. Because a statutory damage award is set for each 
individual infringed work, the total damages can add up significantly 
for online infringements that involve multiple works.”49 The takeaway: 
copyright infringement is sufficiently harmful that it merits severe 
punishment and harsh deterrence. 
2. Judicial Consensus 
The case law on copyright infringement treats it primarily as a matter 
of either (i) wrongful appropriation, or (ii) disincentivization. In the 
 
 46 Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 319, 343 (2013); see also Kelly Cassey Mullally, Blocking Copyrights Revisited, 
37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 57, 83 (2013) (criticizing copyright’s “harsh strict liability 
standard”). 
 47 STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, S. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY NO. 25: LIABILITY OF INNOCENT INFRINGERS 
OF COPYRIGHTS 141 (Alan Latman & William S. Tager) (Comm. Print 1958) (citations 
omitted). 
 48 Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 7, at 441. 
 49 Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: When the Remedy is the 
Wrong, 66 UCLA L. REV. 400, 404 (2019) (citations omitted). 
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seminal case of Arnstein v. Porter, the Second Circuit considered an 
allegation of copying by a songwriter, and determined that “The 
question . . . is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much 
of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the 
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant 
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”50 
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court concluded that “it should not 
be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine 
of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s 
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”51 This view confirms a long line of cases describing 
infringement as something to be deterred and/or punished, lest it lead 
to less creation, and an impoverished collective: “The immediate effect 
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative 
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the 
creation of useful works] for the general public good.”52 Again, the clear 
message is that copyright infringement is bad — not just for creators, 
but also for society in general. 
3. Scholarly Discord 
There are several distinct schools of thought in the literature on 
copyright infringement: One — pecuniary infringement — is concerned 
with potential instances of pecuniary harm resulting from infringement. 
Another — non-pecuniary infringement — considers various non-
pecuniary harms that may stem from infringement. Finally, some 
infringement can be viewed as potentially socially beneficial. Each of 
these types are discussed in turn below. 
a. Pecuniary Infringement  
Copyright infringement is unlawful. The conventional scholarly 
account explains this by maintaining that “[c]opyright infringement 
hurts artists financially, and it also discourages further creativity and 
 
 50 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 51 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 52 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also Mazer 
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).  
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innovation.”53 This is arguably bad for both artists and consumers: “As 
musicians are less able to rely on royalties to make a living, they spend 
less time on their craft and more time searching for alternative sources 
of income — much to the detriment of audiences.”54 
There is a similar line of comparative scholarship comparing the 
experience of artists in countries with less copyright protection to that 
enjoyed by U.S. artists, and finding the foreign systems wanting. For 
example, in an article analyzing the Chinese market, Jiarui Liu observes 
that “copyright incentives . . . preserve[] market conditions for gifted 
musicians to prosper, including a decent standard of living, sufficient 
income to cover production costs and maximum artistic autonomy 
during the creative process.”55 That body of literature describes 
copyright as an economic driver. For example, Sandra Aistars and her 
co-authors note that, “WIPO found that there are strong and positive 
relationships between the contributions of the copyright industries to 
GDP and many indicators of socio-economic performance.”56 
b. Non-pecuniary Infringement 
While the harm resulting from copyright infringement is often framed 
in terms of decreased financial incentives and diminished economic 
benefit, it may alternately (or additionally) be based on moral, or 
reputational, concerns. For example, in a recent lawsuit filed by 
renowned romance author Nora Roberts against a Brazilian writer she 
says copied whole passages from her novels, the concern is less about 
money and incentives — Roberts is one of the most successful novelists 
in the world, after all — and more about moral and reputational harm. 
To borrow Roberts’s own words, the alleged plagiarizer is a “blood leech 
sucking on the body of the writing profession.”57 
 
 53 Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Between 
Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 195, 195 (2006).  
 54 Sandra Aistars, Devlin Hartline & Mark Schultz, Copyright Principles and 
Priorities to Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 769, 778 
(2016). 
 55 Jiarui Liu, Copyright for Blockheads: An Empirical Study of Market Incentive and 
Intrinsic Motivation, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 473 (2015). 
 56 Aistars et al., supra note 54, at 777 (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
WIPO STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 2-3 (2014), 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/performance/pdf/economic_ 
contribution_analysis_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2C9-LD9P]). 
 57 Michael Schaub, Romance Author Nora Roberts Sues Brazilian Writer, Claiming 
Plagiarism, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/books/la-et-jc-nora-
roberts-sues-cristiane-serruya-20190425-story.html [https://perma.cc/2ZGZ-QXSD].  
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In an article considering why and how copyright owners decide to 
sue, Christopher Buccafusco and David Fagundes note a variety of 
copyright infringement suits “rooted in non-pecuniary motivations . . . 
[, including] a pro-choice group suing a pro-life group for its criticism 
of the former’s videos; Michael Savage suing the Council on American-
Islamic Relations to facilitate his anti-Muslim rants; a widow suing a 
documentarian whose film painted an unflattering portrait of her 
deceased husband; and songwriters Don Henley and Jackson Browne 
suing politicians whose views they dislike for using their works at 
campaign rallies.” 58 Ultimately, Buccafusco and Fagundes determine 
that while copyright law “assumes that owners will sue only to redress 
monetary losses, [] [they] actually sue for a variety of reasons, including 
under circumstances that appear unrelated to that concern.”59 In his 
work on IP in non-traditional contexts, Andrew Gilden likewise 
observes the emergence of “a diverse new generation of IP owners,” 
whose interests are “markedly different than the traditional 
beneficiaries of IP laws,” leading them to “often pursue IP disputes for 
reasons having little to do with revenue streams, creativity, or 
intellectual labor.”60 
c. Socially Beneficial Infringement 
Not all commentators, however, view infringement as necessarily 
bad. There exists a small but well-developed body of work that focuses 
on infringement resulting in an arguable social benefit. This literature 
does not necessarily allege a benefit enjoyed equally (or at all) by all 
parties.  
For example, in his work on efficient copyright infringement, David 
Fagundes describes how “[t]he exposure of a company’s fraudulent 
practices may necessarily entail unauthorized publication of their 
copyright-protected internal communications.”61 This, he suggests, 
might be described as societally beneficial infringement. Similarly, 
Rebecca Tushnet has described a potential conflict between the rule 
against copyright infringement and first amendment rights that might 
suggest an opening for socially beneficial infringement. She notes, for 
example, the import of some copyrighted works for social participation:  
 
 58 Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 32, at 2453. 
 59 Id. at 2478-79. 
 60 Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67, 
73 (2018). 
 61 Fagundes, supra note 20, at 1794. 
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If The Sopranos or Queer as Folk have a significant impact on 
our culture, then access to those programs improves a person’s 
ability to participate in making and interpreting that culture. 
There could be a problem for democracy when copyright 
owners set prices so high that some people can’t read or watch 
what many others do. Letting people who have HBO write 
Sopranos fan fiction without fear of the copyright police is well 
and good, but they still need access to HBO in the first place; 
without access, there can be no derivative works and no water 
cooler conversation.62  
Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal describe the unauthorized 
screening of the acclaimed documentary Eyes on the Prize by 
anticopyright activist group Downhill Battle as another example of 
socially beneficial infringement. By 2005, many of the licenses 
originally obtained for the 1987 film had expired, leading it to become 
“for all practical purposes, unavailable to the general public.”63 In 
protest, Downhill Battle “digitized the first three episodes of the 
documentary and posted them online, where the episodes could be 
downloaded for free using peer-to-peer software, like BitTorrent. Then, 
Downhill Battle encouraged people to copy and distribute the files in 
order to raise awareness of copyright’s effect on the circulation of 
information.”64  
In the fair use context, Jeanne Fromer has written that “some courts 
have begun to recognize that market benefits ought to count in favor of 
finding that a defendant’s use if fair . . . Similarly, copyright holders – 
including those that have been litigiously protective of their 
copyrighted material in the past . . . are increasingly acting in ways that 
suggest they realize that certain unauthorized third-party uses of their 
copyrighted works can redound to their financial benefit.”65 She cites 
notorious copyright enforcer Disney as an example.66 The company’s 
megahit franchise Frozen has spawned everything from fan cover videos 
to makeup tutorials for how to look like Princesses Elsa and Anna.67 In 
 
 62 Tushnet, supra note 20, at 545-46. 
 63 PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 20, at 3. 
 64 Id. at 5. 
 65 Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615, 617-
18 (2015). By way of example, Fromer offers Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 
F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), in which the court “reason[ed] that Google Book 
Search’s service can drive book sales and increased attention to long-forgotten books.” 
Id. at 618 n.14. 
 66 Id. at 634. 
 67 See id. at 634 n.107. 
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contrast with its heavy-handed enforcement strategy of the past, some 
commentators have observed that Disney appears to have “learned to 
stop worrying and love copyright infringement,” or at least, in the 
(in)famous (almost-)words of Princess Elsa, “how to let copyright go.”68  
As the foregoing discussion suggests, much of the scholarship on 
copyright infringement has focused on whether or not it is (or can be) 
societally harmful, or beneficial, and when. All of the examples in this 
subsection involve infringement that is not beneficial to the 
rightsholder. Despite the fact that copyright enforcement lies primarily 
with rightsholders,69 the literature has paid little attention to whether 
or when infringement might not only be tolerated, but actually 
monetized, by rightsholders themselves, regardless of its social merit.70 
The next subpart will consider this question as a matter of first 
impression.  
B. The Infringement Solution 
Notwithstanding the long-held view of infringement as anti-
rightsholder, some rightsholders not only tolerate — but actively 
monetize — infringement, in a variety of different situations and for a 
variety of different reasons. This subpart introduces the concept of 
“monetized infringement” through a series of case studies from the 
music, television, film, publishing, and video game industries. The 
examples are presented in accordance with the following taxonomy: (1) 
profitable infringement, in which infringement (or potential 
infringement) results in income for the rightsholder; (2) remedial 
infringement, in which infringement (or potential infringement) 
mitigates a worse outcome for the rightsholder; and (3) promotional 
infringement, in which infringement (or potential infringement) 
amounts to valuable and cost-efficient promotion for the rightsholder’s 
content. There is, of course, some overlap between these categories. For 
example, a valuable promotional infringement might also be classified 
 
 68 Andrew Leonard, How Disney Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Copyright 
Infringement, SALON (May 23, 2014, 8:43 PM), https://www.salon.com/2014/05/23/ 
how_disney_learned_to_stop_worrying_and_love_copyright_infringement/ [https://perma. 
cc/NG44-B2TN]. 
 69 The exception to this is in the case of criminal copyright infringement, which is 
enforced by the federal government. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2018).  
 70 The closest work along these lines is a symposium piece by Tim Wu in which he 
writes about ex post notice rights. There, he defines “tolerated uses” as “technically 
infringing, but nonetheless tolerated.” Wu, supra note 24, at 1. This Essay moves 
beyond mere tolerance to explore situations in which infringement is actively 
encouraged because of an explicit benefit (or expected benefit) to the right holder.  
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as a profitable infringement. A profitable infringement, such as Content 
ID, might also be a form of remedial infringement: a suboptimal 
arrangement that is nonetheless more efficient than Section 512’s notice 
and takedown procedure. Nonetheless, these categories serve as helpful 
buckets for the exploration of this phenomenon.  
An important exception bears mention here: “entrapment” of 
infringers is not monetized infringement. For example, in 2013, it came 
to light that notorious copyright troll Prenda Law had uploaded its own 
videos to various torrent sites, then turned around and sued users who 
downloaded them.71 While these hapless downloaders’ actions were 
ultimately monetized, this Essay explicitly excludes this manner of 
“business model,” not least of all because the benefit to the rightsholder 
is taken at the expense of the user. In other words, copyright trolling is 
explicitly excluded from this Essay’s definition of “monetized 
infringement.” 
1. Profitable Infringement 
Some private rightsholders leverage infringement (or potential 
infringement) because it is better for business. Subsection (a) infra 
discusses an example in which the rightsholders’ business model itself 
explicitly relies upon (potential and actual) infringement in order to be 
profitable. Subsection (b) infra describes a business model that has 
adapted to substitute one form of revenue for another — in this case, 
one that is not only unharmed by, but also potentially improved upon, 
by infringement. 
a. Ad-Supported Content 
By early 2007, online video streaming service YouTube boasted nearly 
seventy million users, collectively watching billions of videos per day.72 
Many of these videos were user-uploaded, and contained content that 
did not belong to the user, and for which the user had not obtained a 
license nor authorization to use. Some of these videos — dancing 
 
 71 See Joe Mullin, Comcast Letter Said to Confirm That Prenda, Steele Planted Porn 
Torrents, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:53 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/ 
2013/08/comcast-letter-said-to-confirm-that-prenda-steele-planted-porn-torrents/ 
[https://perma.cc/D2TA-ALRX]. 
 72 YouTube Continues to Lead U.S. Online Video Market with 28 Percent Market Share, 
According to Comscore Video Matrix, COMSCORE (Nov. 30, 2007), https://www. 
comscore.com/Insights/Press-Releases/2007/11/YouTube-Leads-US-Online-Video-
Market#:~:text=Other%20notable%20findings%20from%20September,viewers%20and
%201.1%20million%20videos [https://perma.cc/CA4E-6GAD].  
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toddlers, crazy cats and the like — most likely qualify as fair use. Others 
— including the infamous lyric videos, or still shots with audio73 — are 
most likely infringing. Monetizing user uploads necessarily loops in 
both types of content, with only the latter qualifying as monetized 
infringement. Historically, YouTube (and similarly situated services) 
have enjoyed an exemption from secondary copyright liability for 
infringing “user-generated content” (“UGC”) under the Section 512 
safe harbor.74 Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) provides that “[a] service provider shall not be liable for . . . 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a 
user . . . if the service provider…does not have actual knowledge . . . is 
not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent; or upon obtaining such knowledge . . . acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material[.]”75 
Despite the existence of this safe harbor, the sheer quantity of 
infringing UGC led YouTube to find itself potentially secondarily liable 
for a massive amount of copyright infringement. This is because Section 
512’s protection extends only to online service providers (“OSPs”) 
without knowledge of the alleged infringement.76 The thrust of most 
content owners’ argument against YouTube was that the company was 
not only aware of rampant infringement — after all, Viacom demanded 
they remove over 100,000 videos containing the company’s content in 
2007 alone77 — but was also arguably encouraging it by failing to 
implement any meaningful deterrent against, or punishment for, users 
 
 73 For domestic and international users without the financial means and/or 
technical ability to access music streaming services, “lyric videos” — streaming audio 
with the words scrolling across the screen — fill the gap. The overwhelming majority 
of videos viewed on YouTube are music videos, and a significant number of those are 
user-uploaded lyric videos (i.e., infringing). See, e.g., Joan E. Solsman, The Surprising 
Rise of YouTube Lyrics Videos, CNET (Aug. 31, 2014, 4:00 AM PT), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/the-rise-and-rise-of-youtube-lyrics-videos/ [https://perma. 
cc/5C6C-ZU5H]. Despite their illegality, there even appears to exist some sort of 
pyramid scheme (falsely) promising lyric videos as a substantial source of income for 
fans. See, e.g., rob_level, How to Make $400 a Day Making Lyric Videos (NO JOKE!), 
SMARTRAPPER, https://www.smartrapper.com/make-400-day-making-lyric-videos-no-
joke/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U5MB-YZGJ].  
 74 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 122-23 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013) (confirming YouTube’s protection under 512(c)). 
 75 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2018). 
 76  Id.  
 77 Geraldine Fabrikant & Saul Hansell, Viacom Asks YouTube to Remove Clips, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/02/technology/02cnd-tube.html 
[https://perma.cc/MCW4-3QFD].  
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found to be in violation of the law (and, indeed, YouTube’s own terms 
of service).78  
And so YouTube found itself in a pickle: With the looming threat of 
crippling copyright infringement litigation from content owners on one 
side, and the promise of massive advertising revenues tied to user-
generated content on the other, what’s a multibillion dollar company to 
do? In YouTube’s case, then-CEO Eric Schmidt decided to invest in 
what was then a relatively new technology: “audio fingerprinting.”79 
Initially, YouTube utilized technology belonging to Audible Magic, a 
pioneer in the field.80 Eventually, YouTube teamed up with content 
owners to develop a proprietary system — initially called “Video 
Identification,”81 and later renamed “Content ID.”82 Content ID works 
by ingesting files provided by content owners, and then doing two 
things: (1) scouring existing content to identify any potentially 
infringing uploads; and (2) comparing newly uploaded files to the 
owner-provided files to halt upload of potentially infringing uploads.83  
In either case, where a potential match is identified, the content 
owner is presented with several options: (i) They can report the user in 
accordance with Section 512’s notice-and-takedown procedure; 
 
 78 See Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=CA& 
template=terms#2ec77765bd (last visited July 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DN9V-SF7C]. 
YouTube’s Community Guidelines state that “the Content you submit must not include 
third-party intellectual property (such as copyrighted material) unless you have 
permission from that party or are otherwise legally entitled to do so. You are legally 
responsible for the Content you submit to the Service. We may use automated systems 
that analyze your Content to help detect infringement and abuse, such as spam, 
malware, and illegal content.” Id.  
 79 See Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube to Test Software to Ease Licensing Fights, WALL ST. 
J. (June 12, 2007, 11:59 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1181612956269 
32114 [https://perma.cc/4LAQ-K7UG]. “Audio fingerprinting” refers to technology that 
enables the automatic detection and identification of copyrighted work on a platform. 
Id.  
 80 Andy Maxwell, Audible Magic Accuses YouTube of Fraud over Content ID 
Trademark, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 11, 2017), https://torrentfreak.com/audible-magic-
accuses-youtube-of-fraud-over-content-id-trademark-170111/ [https://perma.cc/TD64-
6HBY]. 
 81 YouTube Advertisers, Video Identification, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWizsV5Le7s [https://perma.cc/WAW6-BU8T]. 
 82 See YouTube Creators, YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g2U12SsRns [https://perma.cc/7LDN-E2AH]. 
 83 See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/ 
answer/2797370?hl=en#:~:text=How%20Content%20ID%20works,to%20us%20by%2
0content%20owners.&text=When%20this%20happens%2C%20the%20video%20gets
%20a%20Content%20ID%20claim (last visited July 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5GFW-
VCPE]. 
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(ii) they can block the infringing video on the upload, thereby keeping 
it off of the site altogether; or (iii) they can elect to allow the allegedly 
infringing video to upload, and then claim the ad revenues earned 
against it.84 This last option effectively monetizes what might otherwise 
amount to infringement (along with some fair use). It also amounts to 
a real-time license, and is by far the most popular option among 
rightsholders.85 Preferred partners (e.g., major record labels) also have 
access to a manual claiming tool that allows them to search the site for 
very minor (or inconsequential) uses of their content (such that 
Content ID’s bot is unlikely to catch them) and to then claim revenues 
from those videos on a one-off basis. Unsurprisingly, alleged abuses of 
the manual claiming tool have led YouTube to reevaluate its policy with 
regard to manual monetization.86 The tool’s popularity, however, 
confirms rightsholders’ affinity for infringing (or potentially infringing) 
UGC that they can convert to income via Content ID.87 
With Content ID in place, YouTube continues to dominate the global 
video streaming industry.88 Between them, the three major record labels 
— Universal, Sony, and Warner — reported $3.24 billion in streaming 
revenues for the first half of 2018.89 That’s up 36.4% from the same time 
 
 84 See Paul Resnikoff, 99.5% of All Infringing Music Videos Are Resolved by Content ID, 
YouTube Claims, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.digitalmusicnews. 
com/2016/08/08/copyright-problems-resolved-content-id/ [https://perma.cc/4APS-JRAK]. 
 85 See id. (“Content ID accounts for roughly 50% of the music industry’s revenue 
from YouTube.”). 
 86 Sarah Perez, YouTube Shuts Down Music Companies’ Use of Manual Copyright 
Claims to Steal Creator Revenue, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 16, 2019, 6:56 AM PDT), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/16/youtube-shuts-down-music-companies-use-of-
manual-copyright-claims-to-steal-creator-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/TJ9S-68W6]. 
 87 NB: The mere existence of Content ID and participation of the content partners 
does not automatically “license” the latter’s content to YouTube. The only thing 
automatic about Content ID is its initial hold on UGC; it then falls to the content owner 
to decide whether to allow (i.e., encourage) or disallow (i.e., enforce against) the 
potential infringement. 
 88 See INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT REPORT 13 
(2018), https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Music-Consumer-Insight-Report-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4P3-KETZ] (“47% of time spent listening to on-demand music 
[worldwide] is on YouTube.”). One commentator has suggested that Article 17 of the 
European Union’s new Digital Single Market (“DSM”) Directive effectively codifies 
YouTube’s business model, paving the way for more encouraged infringement 
worldwide. See Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music 
Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323, 357 (2020) (“In 
Content ID, YouTube has a prebuilt compliance infrastructure for Article 17. That’s 
because Article 17 was designed for Content ID and not vice versa.”).  
 89 Tim Ingham, The Major Labels Now Turn Over More Than $1BN a Month. But 
Who’s Ruling 2018?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www. 
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period in 2017.90 From a user perspective, far fewer are startled to find 
their uploaded video “disappeared” from the site, thereby leaving more 
content available for the public to consume. A real win-win-win, right? 
Not necessarily.  
Content ID is not available to all content owners, only to select (i.e., 
major — both in terms of financials and in terms of star power) 
partners.91 Smaller content owners are left to the (relatively inefficient) 
notice-and-takedown regime of Section 512(c). Likewise, users may not 
find their uploads missing, but — if the upload contained any content 
picked up by Content ID and monetized by a content partner — they 
won’t earn any ad share revenue on them either. That money goes 
instead to the content partner who has opted to monetize a piece of 
allegedly infringing UGC under the terms of Content ID. The more 
infringing (or even potentially infringing) content is uploaded by users, 
the more a content owner can claim, and the more money can be made.  
Importantly, this is true even where a claimed UGC video may be fair 
use. While the law post-Lenz technically requires a fair use analysis 
before a video is taken down under Section 512,92 it says nothing about 
leaving a video up and claiming the revenue around it. This is 
something YouTube and its Content ID partners have accomplished via 
contract and terms of service. For example, a Content ID FAQ helpfully 
titled “Am I in trouble?” assures the worried recipient of a claim notice:  
Probably not. . . . It’s up to the copyright owners to decide 
whether or not others can reuse their original material.93 
Copyright owners often allow their content to be used in 
YouTube videos in exchange for having ads run on those 
 
musicbusinessworldwide.com/the-major-labels-now-turn-over-more-than-1bn-a-month-
but-whos-ruling-2018/ [https://perma.cc/HU4M-E56E].  
 90 Id. 
 91 For an account of the small creator’s experience vis-à-vis Content ID, see The 
Music Business Made Easy, How to Apply for YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dC15sdHa2DA [https://perma.cc/LQ72-
AQVQ] (noting that “most times, applications that come from individuals . . . are 
rejected”). 
 92 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We 
hold that the statute requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a 
takedown notification[.]”). 
 93 This, of course, is only legally accurate where the reuse is not fair, but the FAQ 
does not get into that, presumably because Content ID operates under its own set of 
rules separate and apart from copyright. For more on this possibility, see Matthew Sag, 
Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
499, 522 (2017) [hereinafter Safe Harbors], discussing the potential displacement of 
copyright law by “DMCA plus” agreements such as Content ID. 
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videos. . . . Sometimes, you can’t monetize a video that has a 
Content ID claim. Instead, the copyright owners can choose to 
monetize your video.94 
And herein lies the rub: under Content ID, more potentially 
infringing UGC (along with some fair use that may nonetheless be 
claimed) equals more money for rightsholders. Record labels no longer 
have to spend millions of dollars creating a promotional music video 
and hoping it goes viral; instead, they can sit back and let fans create 
them, share them, and popularize them, with every click amounting to 
more ad revenues for the rightsholder. Importantly, participation in 
Content ID also does not amount to a de facto license, since a content 
owner can claim one video while blocking another. This Essay intends 
no normative evaluation of whether this arrangement is “better” or 
“worse” than any other; rather, it aims only to emphasize that the 
rightsholders in this example are often benefited — and not harmed — 
by (potential and actual) infringement.  
b. Downloadable Content 
In 2018, video game revenue in the U.S. topped $43.8 billion, making 
it more lucrative than the entire American film industry.95 One of the 
most successful video game developers — a company called Electronic 
Arts (“EA”) — is behind such blockbuster series as The Sims, FIFA, 
Madden NFL, and Battlefield.96 With total net revenue topping $5 billion 
in 2018,97 EA is a popular target for game pirates. To put video game 
piracy in perspective, “[t]he music industry loses $12.5 billion to pirates 
annually. Current trends project the film and television industry will hit 
 
 94 What is a Content ID Claim?, YouTube Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google. 
com/youtube/answer/6013276?hl=en (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
C442-DW3P]. 
 95 Jonathan Shieber, Video Game Revenue Tops $43 Billion in 2018, an 18% Jump from 
2017, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 22, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/22/video-game-
revenue-tops-43-billion-in-2018-an-18-jump-from-2017/ [https://perma.cc/T8Y4-C6DV].  
 96 For a comprehensive list of Electronic Arts’ game library, see generally 
ELECTRONIC ARTS, https://www.ea.com/games/library (last visited June 30, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/R79W-MZLB]. 
 97 Electronic Arts Reports, Q4 FY18 and Full Year FY18 Financial Results, ELECTRONIC 
ARTS (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.ea.com/news/electronic-arts-reports-q4-fy18-
financial-results [https://perma.cc/DHM4-4QQ5 ]. 
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$52 billion in losses to pirates by 2022. And in 2014, [it is] estimated 
the video game industry lost $74 billion to pirates.”98 
These statistics should suggest that piracy is particularly bad for video 
games.99 Indeed, over the years, the video game industry has tried a 
variety of different approaches — many of them highly creative — to 
thwart piracy of their games. Before digital downloading of games, game 
developers could check piracy by requiring players to enter, for 
example, a code printed on the physical box in which the game was 
packaged. If the player didn’t have a code, or if the code had already 
been used (presumably by the original, lawful owner) the game 
wouldn’t play, or might throw the player in video game “jail” where 
they’d have to listen to a lecture on piracy.100  
Of course, the evolution of digital gaming reduced the effectiveness 
of this approach, leading some companies to rely on other mechanisms, 
ranging from user shaming to game degradation. For example, game 
developer Remedy shames pirates of its popular game Quantum Break 
by slapping a skull-and-bones eye patch over the main character, Jack 
Joyce, whenever a pirated copy is detected.101 One of the most popular 
games of all time, The Sims, has discouraged pirates of The Sims 4 via 
programming that makes pirated copies increasingly pixelated and 
blurry over time.102 Pirates of Crysis Warhead find their bullets and 
grenades replaced by hapless (and harmless) chickens.103 One of the 
more vengeful approaches, and this author’s personal favorite, was 
devised by the creators of Super Nintendo’s Earthbound. Pirates face a 
much tougher game than legal players, only to be “rewarded” at the very 
end by the game freezing and wiping all saved copies.104  
 
 98 Kirk Kaczmarek, The Unwinnable War on Video Game Piracy, RICH. J.L. & TECH. 
BLOG (Feb. 9, 2019), https://jolt.richmond.edu/2019/02/09/the-unwinnable-war-on-
video-game-piracy/ [https://perma.cc/86LB-3754].  
 99 Alternately, they might suggest an ill-founded assumption that every pirated copy 
would have otherwise been purchased at full retail price.  
 100 Brad Chacos, 12 Hilarious, Brutally Devious Ways Game Developers Punish Pirates, 
PC WORLD (Apr. 9, 2016, 7:07 AM PDT), https://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
2602876/10-hilarious-brutally-devious-ways-pc-game-developers-punish-pirates.html 
#slide11 [https://perma.cc/V4TU-6BTK].  
 101 Id. Developers use a host of different methods to detect pirated copies; one of the 
most popular methods is to “leak” a modified version of the game to torrent sites (which 
modification identifies a pirated copy). These versions generally contain an “easter egg” 
which results in corruption, an altered gaming experience (e.g., extra hard levels), and 
even memory deletion. See id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See D. P., Crysis Warhead Chicken Bullets, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gemaltF85oQ [https://perma.cc/RS2V-QN5E].  
 104 Chacos, supra note 100.  
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More recently, however, the industry generally — and EA in 
particular — has had a change of heart. In an interview with a popular 
gamer blog, EA’s then-CEO John Riccitiello quipped: “By the way, if 
there are any pirates you’re writing for, please encourage them to pirate 
FIFA Online, NBA Street Online, Battleforge, Battlefield Heroes . . . If they 
would just pirate lots of it I’d love them. [laughs] Because what’s in the 
middle of the game is an opportunity to buy stuff.”105 Similarly, Gabe 
Newell, Founder and Managing Director of software developer Valve, 
recently called pirates “underserved customers,” and added, “[I can] 
make some interesting money off of it.”106  
This sentiment is a far cry from the doomsday scenarios predicted by 
execs of years past. So what gives? Why are the creators and copyright 
owners of popular video games courting the very people who infringe 
those copyrights? The explanation is fairly straightforward: In the new 
video game business model, they aren’t selling the copyrighted work — 
in this case, the video game — rather, they are selling downloadable 
content (or “DLC” in industry-speak) that operates from inside of the 
game.  
Originally devised as a means of generating long-term (as opposed to 
one-shot) revenue on a sold game, DLC is additional content that can 
be downloaded within a video game. Common types of DLC include 
extra levels, new characters, additional weapons/vehicles, and custom 
outfits.107 While a single DLC purchase tends to cost far less than the 
price of a game, multiple DLC purchases — for example, developer 
Activision offers players of Modern Warfare a new level every few 
months108 — can add up to far more spending over time than the one-
time purchase of a game. While you can pirate a copy of Modern 
Warfare, you won’t be able to customize your characters nor play the 
newly released levels without shelling out money for in-game DLC. In 
other words, pirates can “steal the disc[/game], but they can’t steal the 
DLC.”109 This is because the DLC is purchased through connection 
 
 105 Ben Kuchera, EA’s New Motto: Please Pirate Our Games…er, Storefronts, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 23, 2009, 8:07 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2009/06/eas-new-
motto-please-pirate-our-games-er-storefronts/ [https://perma.cc/YK5B-PXF7].  
 106 Mike Masnick, Valve Exec Explains How to Compete with Privacy, TECHDIRT (Feb. 
19, 2009, 11:47 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090219/1124433835.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/L5E6-57N9]. 
 107 DLC Definition, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/dlc (last visited Jan. 
10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V7V6-SQPM].  
 108 Id. 
 109 General Discussion - EA’s Stance on Piracy, GIANT BOMB, https://www.giantbomb. 
com/forums/general-discussion-30/eas-stance-on-piracy-377362/ (last visited Jan. 10, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/Y78G-5DY8].  
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between a legitimate copy of the game and the developer’s store 
server.110 Without access to purchase DLC, the pirated game is rendered 
largely worthless. Infringement, then, becomes just another way of 
getting the game developers’ real product — DLC — in front of more 
potential customers.  
The potential network effects from an enhanced user base — one 
facilitated, in part, by monetized infringement — is hard to overstate. 
The entire business model behind “software as a service” (“SaaS”), for 
example, depends on lots of installations at low- to no-cost, followed by 
the sale of upgrades and premium versions once a user (and a user’s 
network) has become dependent upon the product.111 The file-hosting 
service Dropbox, for example, is free up to two gigabytes. Once users 
exceed the free allotment, they can upgrade to Dropbox Plus (two 
terabytes for $9.99/month) or Dropbox Professional (three terabytes for 
$16.58/month).112 
Before SaaS, there was piracy as a means of competition suppression: 
At first, Microsoft tolerated rampant piracy of its operating system 
(“OS”) in China because, as then-CEO Bill Gates famously said, “As 
long as they’re going to steal [software], we want them to steal ours.”113 
Today, the company actively rewards pirates by offering upgrades of all 
outdated Microsoft operating systems — legitimate and pirated — to 
the latest version for free. Why? Because “Microsoft is making a 
strategic play to get as many users hooked on the Windows 10 platform 
as possible. . . . The more users Microsoft gets now, the more services it 
can sell downstream — and it’s hoping even pirates can be flipped into 
paying customers.”114 
 
 110 See, e.g., Robert Earl Wells III, What is DLC in Gaming and How Does it Work?, 
LIFEWIRE (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-dlc-in-gaming-how-does-it-
work-4707377#:~:text=The%20inside%20scoop%20on%20downloadable%20content 
&text=Downloadable%20content%2C%20or%20DLC%2C%20is,DLC%20to%20make
%20a%20profit [https://perma.cc/FS2L-6RSF] (explaining the process of purchasing 
DLC).  
 111 See, e.g., Claire Brenner, What is SaaS? A Software-as-a-Service Guide, LEARNING 
HUB (Apr. 16, 2018), https://learn.g2.com/what-is-saas#what-is-saas [https://perma.cc/ 
5GRG-TX2Z] (describing Business to Consumer SaaS business model). 
 112 Choose Your Dropbox Personal Plan, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/ 
individual (last visited Jul. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/75Q9-H4R3]. 
 113 Gates, Buffett a Bit Bearish, CNET (July 2, 1998, 5:00 AM PT), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/gates-buffett-a-bit-bearish/ [https://perma.cc/8U87-AH3Q]. 
 114 Dan Kedmey, Here’s Why Microsoft Is Giving Pirates the Next Windows for Free, 
TIME (Mar. 20, 2015, 1:06 PM EDT), https://time.com/3749434/microsoft-windows-10-
pirates-free/ [https://perma.cc/PZ4X-US9Z]. 
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2. Remedial Infringement 
This section presents an example of cost savings accomplished by 
affirmatively encouraging infringement as the lesser of two evils. In 
other words, I would rather not have a bunch of noisy birds squawking 
on the tree outside my bedroom window every morning, but since I’ve 
come to accept that they will be there no matter what I do, I can at least 
entice them to the side of the tree farthest from where I park my car 
(and so avoid a barrage of bird droppings) by placing a bird feeder there. 
This Essay refers to this as encouraging “remedial infringement.” 
The remedial approach is taken by some video game developers for 
whom piracy is not the only — nor, importantly, the worst — problem. 
For these rightsholders, so-called “gray market resellers” present the 
greatest challenge. Gray market resellers resell “keys” used for 
downloading video games on platforms such as Steam,115 an online 
video game store where users can also play with other gamers, and even 
create their own games. Gray market resellers typically resell keys sent 
promotionally (for example, to “influencers” in hopes of social media 
promotion), or purchased from regions where the game is sold 
cheaper.116  
One of the most notorious gray market resellers is a company called 
G2A. G2A calls itself “the world’s largest marketplace for digital 
products.”117 Video game developers call them a pain in the neck. In 
addition to not making any money on the resale of game keys, 
developers say that fake and broken keys cost them tons of money in 
customer service efforts — so much so, that they’ve begun encouraging 
prospective reseller clients to pirate their games instead. Rami Ismail, 
co-founder of independent game developer Vlambeer, recently urged, 
“If you can’t afford or don’t want to buy our games full-price, please 
pirate them rather than buying them from a key reseller. These sites cost 
 
 115 Store, STEAM, https://store.steampowered.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/LH2R-DCER]. 
 116 See, e.g., Wes Fenlon & Tyler Wilde, PC Game Storefronts Compared: What You 
Need to Know About Retailers and Resellers, PC GAMER (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.pcgamer.com/pc-game-storefronts-compared-what-you-need-to-know-
about-retailers-and-resellers/ [https://perma.cc/AA4N-C2V2] (describing various 
methods of obtaining keys). 
 117 Marketplace, G2A, https://www.g2a.co/what-is-g2a/marketplace/ (last visited Jan. 
10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5VAT-SEDF].  
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us so much potential dev time in customer service, investigating fake 
key requests, figuring out credit card chargebacks, and more:”118  
 
Ismail is far from the only game developer to express this sentiment. 
Joining him in encouraging infringement of their copyrighted games are 
the likes of Mike Rose, founder of game developer No More Robots, 
who similarly pleaded, “Please, if you’re going to buy a game from G2A, 
just pirate it instead! Genuinely! Devs don’t see a penny either way, so 
we’d much rather G2A didn’t see money either.”119 Game developer 
Squid Games has likewise stated, “Please torrent our games instead of 
buying them on G2A.”120  
 
 118 Fraser Brown, Developers Tell People to Pirate Their Games Instead of Using G2A, 
PC GAMER (July 1, 2019), https://www.pcgamer.com/developers-tell-people-to-pirate-
their-games-instead-of-using-g2a/ [https://perma.cc/SE2Q-H6R7]. 
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. 
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In other words, if they’re not going to see any money anyway, these 
rightsholders would prefer to at least not incur additional customer 
service expenses. The best way to minimize those expenses, they’ve 
found, is to shut down the key resellers by encouraging prospective 
secondary key buyers to simply infringe instead. After all, a consumer 
who thinks they’ve purchased a legitimate game key is likely to feel 
entitled to complain when something goes wrong. Pirates, on the other 
hand, are notoriously low maintenance.  
3. Promotional Infringement 
Finally, some private rightsholders utilize (actual and prospective) 
infringement as a form of valuable promotional benefit. The subsections 
that follow describe examples of what is herein called “promotional 
infringement” in each of the music, film/television, and publishing 
industries. Interestingly, this type of infringement is most likely to be 
monetized by either rightsholders with few resources (such that they 
cannot otherwise afford the marketing this promotion brings), or 
rightsholders with abundant resources (but for whom this brand of 
promotion is not something that can be bought).  
a. Music 
Streaming services like YouTube and Vimeo are flooded with so-
called “fan vids” — DIY music videos (of both the fair use and non-fair 
use varieties) that sometimes surpass official videos in popularity. In 
some cases, these videos are taken down by rightsholders. In other 
cases, rightsholders allow, and sometimes even promote, these 
infringing fan vids. When Polish film student Ivan Grbin made a fan vid 
for Crystal Castles’ song “Plague” using footage from Andrzej 
Zulawski’s 1981 psychological thriller Possession,121 the group’s 
manager reached out to Grbin asking if he’d be willing to cut the footage 
so they could use it as their official music video for the song. The artists 
then posted the fan vid to their Facebook page, and sent the link to 
 
 121 Ivan Grbin, Crystal Castles “PLAGUE” Video, VIMEO (2014), https://vimeo.com/ 
89492388 [https://perma.cc/QPJ5-X8NZ]. 
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publicists. Ironically, a bot eventually took the video down for 
copyright infringement. The artists have since reinstated it.122 
Interestingly, director Andrzej Zulawski has been similarly copacetic 
about the unlicensed use of his footage.123  
Rapper Danny Brown had a similar reaction when Brooklyn-based 
graphic designer Steven Menegozzi posted a video for Brown’s hit song 
“Grown Up” using Fisher Price toy sets.124 According to Menegozzi, 
“[b]efore I started making anything, I spent a lot of time blocking out 
shots and relating them to the song’s lyrics. And since 3D takes so long, 
I had a lot of time to improve and add things to the video. Danny Brown 
actually tweeted the video. I’m glad he saw it and liked it.”125  
Likewise, when two members of Chinese boy group WayV released a 
choreographed video of recording artist Khalid’s track with Billie Eilish, 
“lovely,” Khalid praised and retweeted it: 
 
 122 Luis Muñoz, Introducing the Amateur Director Behind Fan-Made Videos for Danny 
Brown, Flying Lotus and More, FACT MAGAZINE (May 15, 2015), https://www.factmag. 
com/2015/05/15/the-webs-best-fan-made-music-videos-flying-lotus-danny-brown-aphex-
twin/ [https://perma.cc/Z7EM-SXNU].  
 123 Id. 
 124 Steven Menegozzi, Danny Brown – Grown Up, VIMEO (2015), https://vimeo.com/ 
104376798 [https://perma.cc/2R62-QU2Y].  
 125 Muñoz, supra note 122. 
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These fans used the music without a license, and posted it online 
without permission.126 They credit Khalid and Eilish in the video’s title, 
such that their infringement (if it is) is likely willful. Under extant 
copyright law, Khalid and his label could have the video taken down, 
and Ten and Winwin could be liable for up to $150,000 in statutory 
damages.127 Instead, the artist gifted them nearly 100,000 likes and 
50,000 retweets,128 inarguably encouraging their efforts, and those of 
fans like them.  
Why would a rightsholder not only refrain from enforcing their 
statutory rights, but also potentially encourage further infringement in 
this way? The answer is simple: free and effective promotion for the 
 
 126 The original post to YouTube may well have been covered by Content ID’s real-
time license, but all subsequent downloads and reposts of the video to various platforms 
and social media networks, group texts and subreddits, would not be. 
 127 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018).  
 128 See WayV, [Rainbow V] TEN X WINWIN Choreography : Lovely (Billie Eilish, 
Khalid) (Ring and Portrait Remix), YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=8ovHSQwp1n0 [https://perma.cc/QZM7-BK52].  
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underlying work. Khalid and his label did not have to spend any money 
making, producing, or editing the fan video. They pay nothing to 
YouTube to host the video (and indeed, under Content ID, can even 
collect advertising revenue from it). The video has over twelve million 
views.129 While professionally produced music videos can cost 
anywhere from hundreds of thousands to seven digits to produce, Ten 
and Winwin’s video cost Khalid and his label nothing beyond foregoing 
a potential maximum payout of only $150,000, less attorneys’ fees and 
bad press for suing fans over an indisputably creative and successful 
video.130  
b. Film & Television 
In 2005, television studio Home Box Office (“HBO”) sought to fight 
back against torrent sites by uploading en masse bogus and/or 
malfunctioning files of its hit show Rome.131 Even a user with a 
download client capable of detecting the junk files could be significantly 
stalled — and often thwarted — in their attempt to illegally download 
episodes of the show. In some cases, corrupt torrent files were known 
to destroy a downloader’s hard drive; in other cases, the inability to tell 
a good from a corrupt file resulted in a longer, more complicated search-
and-download process. If nothing else, HBO’s “torrent poisoning” made 
piracy of its show more onerous, and so less attractive.132  
Seven years later, in 2012, HBO’s hit show Game of Thrones was 
named the most pirated show of the year,133 with somewhere between 
3.7 and 4.2 million torrents.134 On an investors’ call in 2013, Jeff 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 It’s worth noting that, despite the arguable cost savings and promotional 
advantages accorded to both Khalid and his record label in this example, the label is 
most likely the rightsholder, not Khalid (who most likely has assigned his rights to the 
label under a recording contract). This is important because the interests of creators 
and intermediary rightsholders can — and often do — diverge. In such a case, the 
encouragement of infringement by a creator who is not a rightsholder might viewed as 
a means for the artist to control downstream uses despite copyright law’s assumption 
that rightsholders’ interests should dominate.  
 131 Nat Torkington, HBO Attacking BitTorrent, RADAR (Oct. 4, 2005), 
http://radar.oreilly.com/2005/10/hbo-attacking-bittorrent.html [https://perma.cc/UKE2-
FP2J]. 
 132 See id. 
 133 Adi Robertson, High ‘Game of Thrones’ Piracy is ‘Better Than an Emmy,’ Says Time 
Warner CEO, VERGE (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:44 PM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2013/8/8/4602764/game-of-thrones-piracy-better-than-an-emmy-says-time-warner-ceo 
[https://perma.cc/C6T4-73HY].  
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FREAK (Dec. 23, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/game-of-thrones-most-pirated-tv-
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Bewkes, then-CEO of HBO’s parent company Time Warner, bragged 
about the show’s illegal downloads: “If you go around the world, I think 
you’re right, that ‘Game of Thrones’ is the most pirated show in the 
world. . . . Now that’s better than an Emmy.”135 Why the change of 
heart? According to Bewkes, much of the show’s popularity is owed to 
immense Internet buzz, something that illegal downloads are very good 
at generating.136  
HBO isn’t the only Hollywood player to embrace infringement. The 
sudden and complete shutdown of Megaupload — the hugely popular, 
global torrent site — by the U.S. Justice Department in 2012137 offers a 
neat natural experiment for observing the effects, both good and bad, of 
mass infringement. Many content owners were quick to highlight the 
increased traffic enjoyed by legal download sites following the 
shutdown.138 But there was another, unexpected and remarkable effect 
that has received far less attention: worldwide box office receipts for 
medium-budget films went down, suggesting that for films without a 
huge marketing budget, “file sharing might be the most economical 
method of advertising and market research available.”139 After all, “[t]he 
word-of-mouth effect that particularly helps a smaller-budget film can’t 
begin until someone sees it, and that often happens through an 
illegitimate download from a ‘torrent’ site.”140  
Despite being the most frequently and widely discussed, torrenting is 
far from the only form of infringement facing film and television 
owners. At least as common is the practice of sharing subscriber logins 
 
show-of-2012-121223/ [https://perma.cc/R99P-G7BB]; Ernesto Van der Sar, Game of 
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https://torrentfreak.com/game-of-thrones-most-pirated-tv-show-of-the-season-120608/ 
[https://perma.cc/K5NR-G6ZR]. 
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an-emmy-he-has-a-point/ [https://perma.cc/JQ7X-S4N5].  
 136 See id. 
 137 See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, U.S. Authorities Shut Down Megaupload for Piracy, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 19, 2012, 2:49 PM PT), https://www.hollywoodreporter. 
com/thr-esq/megaupload-shut-down-piracy-283397 [https://perma.cc/B6YG-KT6Z].  
 138 See, e.g., Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone in 60 Seconds: The Impact of the 
Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales, 33 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 1, 1 (2014) (“[T]he 
shutdown of Megaupload and its associated sites caused digital revenues for three major 
motion picture studios to increase by 6.5–8.5%.”). 
 139 Jake Rossen, How Hollywood Can Capitalize on Piracy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 17, 
2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520336/how-hollywood-can-capitalize-
on-piracy/ [https://perma.cc/7MXK-3RR9].  
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in contravention of subscription terms. For example, HBO’s streaming 
service, HBO NOW, allows different people in the same household to 
log on simultaneously to watch different programming.141 Ostensibly, 
this might allow Mom to watch the news upstairs, Dad to watch a 
thriller in the basement, and little Sue to watch Sesame Street in the 
living room, all at the same time. In the real world, subscribers 
frequently share logins with friends outside of their immediate 
families/physical households. The practice appears to be a well-known 
secret:  
 
Even if we argue that the subscriber sharing their password is not 
infringing, but rather breaching their contract with the platform, the 
non-subscribing user of the password is inarguably infringing as they 
lack any license with the platform to be breached. If HBO and Netflix 
wanted to stop this infringement, they could restrict accounts to a single 
IP address, but they don’t. Why not? Because “[p]eople sharing [cable 
TV] subscriptions, running wires down the backs of apartment 
buildings. Our experience is that it leads to more paying subscribers.”142 
And when reports surface that platforms are going to begin “cracking 
down,” spokespersons are quick to point out that the companies are 
 
 141 Help Center, HBO NOW, http://help.hbonow.com/Answer/Detail/27 (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7D8A-2G8L] (“[I]n most cases, members of your 
household can sign in to HBO NOW on different devices, and watch different shows at 
the same time. Your HBO NOW email and password should not be shared with anyone 
outside your household. For security reasons, the number of simultaneous streams is 
limited.”). 
 142 Rossen, supra note 139.  
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“‘not involved in any enforcement relating to casual password sharing 
among friends and relatives’ . . . [but instead are focused] on ‘theft of 
creative works on a massive scale,’ mostly [by] those who operate piracy 
sites or apps.”143 Again, the idea is that a potential customer has to try 
a service out in order to get hooked and, hopefully, converted to a paid 
subscription.  
Another example of monetizing infringement in the film and 
television context bears mention, as it forms the basis for how most such 
content is consumed today. In 2018, Netflix produced and released 
eighty films. That is two films per week, in addition to 700 original 
television series.144 By way of comparison, in the same year, two of the 
world’s largest movie studios, Disney and Warner Bros., released twelve 
and twenty films, respectively.145 NBC launched thirteen new television 
series, five of which were canceled.146  
In addition to original programming, Netflix also attracts viewers by 
purchasing rights to shows that it believes will be popular with its 
subscribers. And how do they decide which shows to buy? According 
to Netflix VP of Content Acquisition, Kelly Merryman, “we look at what 
does well on piracy sites.”147 It follows, then, that creators of shows 
want their pirate numbers to be high when Netflix goes poking around, 
in hopes that they will get picked up by the country’s largest 
subscription streaming service.148 In exchange, Netflix suggests that 
once it enters a market, piracy decreases: “Netflix is so much easier than 
 
 143 Antonio Villas-Boas, Big Streaming Companies like Netflix and HBO Are Looking to 
Crack Down on Freeloaders Who Use Other People’s Passwords and Accounts, BUSINESS 
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 146 See Jason Dietz, 2018–19 TV Season Scorecard, METACRITIC (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.metacritic.com/feature/tv-renewal-scorecard-2018-2019-season [https://perma. 
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 147 Todd Spangler, How Netflix Uses Piracy to Pick Its Programming, VARIETY (Sept. 
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and Usage Statistics, BUSINESS APPS (June 23, 2020), https://www.businessofapps. 
com/data/netflix-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/FQQ7-ZC6Y].  
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torrenting. You don’t have to deal with files, you don’t have to download 
them and move them around. You just click and watch.”149 When 
Netflix first entered Canada, for example, BitTorrent traffic dropped 
50%.150 Even with this information, some shows, like Showtime’s 
Dexter, refuse to license to Netflix at any price. This is because they are 
interested in driving demand and increasing subscriber rates — in this 
example, for Showtime’s proprietary streaming service — not in curbing 
infringement.151  
c. Publishing 
E-book marketplaces like Amazon have taken a similar “let-them-
infringe-and-they-will-come” approach. As with music, many e-book 
sellers have dropped, or effectively dropped, digital rights management 
(“DRM”) as an anti-piracy tool, purportedly because they’d rather get 
the books out there than not. After all, word-of-mouth leads to sales. 
According to publisher Tim O’Reilly, “Amazon is effectively doing that 
[ignoring their own DRM restrictions] now with the Kindle. They’re not 
counting. I’ve switched between three different Android phones. I’m on 
my second Kindle, my second iPad. I have ten devices registered. It 
would be trivial for me to give my Kindle account credentials to other 
people in my family or good friends and have everything I buy on Kindle 
sent to one of them. . . . If people wanted 10,000 pirated copies of a 
book, the publisher and the author would be very, very well off. If 
10,000 people are willing to pirate it, there’s a very large number willing 
to pay for it.”152 Again, even if we argue that an individual privately 
copying an e-book from one of their devices onto another of their 
devices is either a breach of contract,153 or permitted under Sony v. 
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Universal,154 the same cannot be said of an individual privately copying 
an e-book from one of their devices onto the device of a friend or co-
worker.  
As journalist and author Cory Doctorow puts it: “it’s hard to turn 
fame into money in the arts, [but] it’s impossible to turn obscurity into 
money in the arts . . . It doesn’t matter how you plan on making your 
money . . . you won’t get the chance unless people have heard of your 
stuff.”155 Infringement, it turns out, is a powerful promotional tool. In 
other words, infringement can be monetized, a possibility that is not 
recognized under the current statute. 
II. THE CASE FOR INFRINGEMENT IN COPYRIGHT 
Part I described a series of examples in which rightsholders monetize 
infringement of their copyrighted works. In so doing, these 
rightsholders forego the possibility of equitable and/or monetary 
remedies that might be earned through an infringement suit. This Part 
considers several reasons why rightsholders might act in a manner that 
appears, at least by the conventional statutory account, to run counter 
to their best interests.  
A. Statutory Fit and Price Discrimination 
One explanation for the monetization of infringement might have to 
do with the nature of copyright law itself. As is characteristic of 
statutory licenses generally, copyright’s compulsory licenses are one-
size-fits-all. This means they are only differentiated, when at all, by 
licensee type,156 but not by market valuation (as held by user, or by 
product/platform) — i.e., product differentiation — nor by nature or 
type of use — price differentiation. For example, Amazon Music pays 
the same streaming rate under Section 115 as Spotify does, despite the 
fact that Spotify relies entirely upon music streaming as its business 
model, while Amazon uses its music service primarily as a loss leader to 
 
 154 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 
(1984) (holding non-commercial uses of copyrighted works to a higher standard of 
harm in order to show infringement). 
 155 Cory Doctorow, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Piracy, DRM, and the E-book 
Issue, SIMON FRASER UNIV. PUB. (Jan. 18, 2013), https://publishing.sfu.ca/2013/01/the-
good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-piracy-drm-and-the-e-book-issue/ [https://perma.cc/9SGS-
N5PV].  
 156 For example, Section 114 differentiates between interactive and noninteractive 
services. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i) (2018).  
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sell Amazon Prime memberships.157 Likewise, Spotify pays the same 
royalty to a composer when a song is streamed by a paying user as it 
does when a song is streamed by a “freemium” (or, ad-sponsored) 
user.158  
The lack of both price and product differentiation under a statutory 
license can lead to pricing that neither reflects, nor responds to, the 
market or consumer preferences. As a result, some consumers might be 
willing to pay more, or could negotiate to pay less, for a particular piece, 
or use, of content. This inefficiency may reduce incentives for the 
creation and production of content that satisfies consumer demand.159 
For example, the developers monetizing piracy of their video games by 
selling pirates DLC have (at least) two price tiers: one for full-paying 
customers (who buy both the game and the DLC) and one for pirates 
(who don’t buy the game, but do buy the DLC). Notably, these 
developers would prefer a user pirate a game than buy it new.160 To 
understand why, consider a user with an endowment of $100 to spend 
on video games: They can buy a used game for $30 (money the 
developer never sees), leaving them $70 to spend on DLC (money that 
goes to the developer). Alternately, they can pirate the game for $0, 
leaving them $100 to spend on the DLC (money that goes to the 
developer). In this way, piracy (and its subsequent monetization) of 
their games is better business for the developer. It may also lead to 
higher overall utility for the user, who gets to play more levels, buy 
more lives, etc.161 Likewise, Netflix has two types of customers: paying 
and soon-to-be-paying. The former pays more than the latter, of course, 
but this needn’t always be the case. With plans to continue releasing 
original content, Netflix allows password-sharing as part of its plan to 
monetize that infringement.162 
 
 157 See id. § 115. The measure of intensity, or import, of use is often referred to as 
“percent of revenue” in industry parlance. 
 158 See id. 
 159 For more on the impact of price and product differentiation (and the lack thereof) 
on content and markets, see García, Penalty Default, supra note 17, at 1142-45. 
 160 See, e.g., Jon Devine, Pre-Owned Games Are Costing the Industry More Than Piracy, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 29, 2012, 10:54 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/pre-
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In their work on government waiver of statutory requirements, David 
Barron and Todd Rakoff suggest that an increase in professional 
lobbying has, in some cases, led to oddly specific and narrow statutes: 
“It is [ ] neither new nor news that even general federal statutes have 
often contained particularistic provisions that seem, in terms of scale, 
out of place. These have often been explained as the results of a yielding 
by Congress to special interests whose cases have been pushed by 
particular legislators. We suspect . . . that the increased specificity of 
many modern statutes can be in part explained in the same way.”163  
Unfortunately, the narrower and more specific a statute is, the less 
likely it is to apply evenly and well to differently situated parties. 
Writing about the drafting of the current Copyright Act, Jessica Litman 
notes that “most of the statutory language [of the 1976 Copyright Act] 
was not drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, 
the language evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, 
publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property 
rights the statute defines. In some cases, affected parties agreed upon 
language, which was then adopted by Congress, while disagreeing about 
what the language meant.”164 In other work, she describes “the political 
power of copyright lobbies, aided by members of Congress eager to be 
glamoured by famous entertainers and willing to be persuaded that the 
only fundamental problem with the United States economy is 
widespread piracy of American creations,”165 as leading to legislative 
capture.  
For example, after the passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 
which extended copyright’s term by twenty years, Herbert Hovenkamp 
suggested that: 
[I]t is hard to come up with any serious argument that 
retroactive extensions of old copyrights serve the constitutional 
purpose of promoting the progress of the useful arts. Those 
inventions and ideas have already been created. The Copyright 
Term Extension Act shows us Congress at its worst, passing 
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legislation at the behest of power interest groups at society’s 
expense.166 
William Patry, former counsel to the Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property, described his congressional experience similarly: 
Copyright interest groups hold fundraisers for members of 
Congress, write campaign songs, invite members of Congress 
(and their staff) to private movie screenings or sold-out 
concerts, and draft legislation they expect Congress to pass 
without any changes. In the 104th Congress, they are drafting 
the committee reports and haggling among themselves about 
what needs to be in the report. In my experience, some 
copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent members of 
Congress and staff interfering with what they view as their 
legislation and their committee report. With the 104th 
Congress we have, I believe, reached a point where legislative 
history must be ignored because not even the hands of 
congressional staff have touched committee reports.167 
The degree of specificity resulting from a heavily lobbied process can 
lead to a body of law — like copyright — that is ripe for defection by 
those unable to participate in the legislative process (i.e., consumers 
and independent creators). In his work on user-generated content, Ed 
Lee describes the resulting informal copyright practices as gap fillers: 
“While formal licenses allow the parties themselves to fill the gaps left 
open by formal copyright law by private ordering, often the transaction 
costs associated with formal licenses are far too high for any negotiation 
to occur[.]”168 This defection, en masse and over time, has led even well-
connected industry interests to respond in kind. After all, copyright law 
affords certain rights, but it does not guarantee income from those 
rights.  
B. Preference Endogeneity 
Defection from a regime of statutory protection — in this case, 
protection against copyright infringement — suggests a divergence in 
either ideology or goals on the part of the protected parties — in this 
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case, rightsholders. The same homogenous perspective adopted by 
copyright’s statutory licenses is reflected in copyright policy’s 
assumption of uniform, exogenous preferences on the part of 
rightsholders; namely, the assumption that all rightsholders view 
unauthorized copying as bad, and so don’t want to be infringed.  
As the case studies in Part I.B supra showed, however, rightsholders’ 
preferences around infringement are actually both heterogeneous and 
endogenous: Universal Music sought to take down user Lenz’s allegedly 
unauthorized YouTube video, while Warp Records promoted a user’s 
unauthorized fan vid.169 In some cases, a rightsholder’s private 
preference may fluctuate over time: Electronic Arts spent many years 
and lots of money fighting game pirates before eventually flipping to a 
DLC business model that embraces infringement of their games.170 
Rightsholder preferences may even change from copyrighted work to 
copyrighted work. HBO flooded torrent sites with corrupted copies of 
Rome, but bragged to stockholders about Game of Thrones’ popularity 
on those same sites.171  
Reliance on a standard of uniform, exogenous preferences results in 
a statutory regime ill-suited to parties who differ from the assumed 
preference. I argue this is exactly what has happened in the copyright 
context, and helps to explain not only monetized infringement, but 
other tensions in copyright policy as well. For example, the first sale 
doctrine in copyright assumes that consumers don’t want to be held to 
paying the rights owner a royalty upon resale of a work, and so allows 
a copyrighted work to be resold without permission or payment to the 
rightsholder.172 New ventures like UppstArt, which track art upon 
resale and automatically kick a royalty back to the rights owner, 
challenge this notion as they continue to attract buyers who like the 
idea of supporting art and artists.173  
Similarly, Section 115174 — the section of the statute that requires 
terrestrial radio stations to pay a royalty to songwriters, but not to 
owners of sound recordings — purports to understand that owners of 
sound recordings view radio play as valuable promotion such that no 
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payment is required, or perhaps that these owners will “make up the 
difference” with higher royalties on the digital streaming side.175 Private 
deals like the one entered into between Clear Channel Media and Big 
Machine Records, in which the media conglomerate agrees to pay the 
record label a terrestrial performance royalty anytime it plays a Taylor 
Swift song, challenge this notion.176 So too do recent proposals like the 
Ask Musicians For Music (“AM-FM”) Act, which proposes a terrestrial 
performance right for sound recordings, and which has the backing of 
powerful rightsholders groups like the Recording Industry Association 
of America (“RIAA”) and the National Music Publishers Association 
(“NMPA”).177  
It’s worth noting, too, that in the same way enforcement can be 
performative, so too can nonenforcement be.178 An artist, like Danny 
Brown, who reaches out to compliment a fan on his DIY video, is 
 
 175 Statutory performance royalties are higher for sound recordings than for musical 
compositions. For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see, for example, Kristelia A. 
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the “differential” between the rates paid to the labels and the publishers that was the 
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 176 For more detail on this deal, see García, Penalty Default, supra note 17, at 1136-56. 
 177 Claudia Rosenbaum & Ed Christman, Congress Introduces AM-FM Act to Get 
Artists & Labels Paid for Radio Play, BILLBOARD (Nov. 21, 2019), 
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backers, Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) Congressman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), 
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 178 For more on how acts and words can be “performative,” see generally J.L. AUSTIN, 
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962), (explaining how words 
are performative in that they perform a “speech act”). 
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communicating that he values the fan (perhaps as much as he values 
the promotion). A video game developer who tweets out a plea that 
users pirate a game rather than buy a gray market key is communicating 
a compromise, a prioritization of cost savings over expenditure 
(especially since neither results in revenue). The failure to recognize 
preference endogeneity can lead rightsholders to act incongruously to 
statutory expectations, including by monetizing the very infringement 
they are assumed to disfavor. 
C. Changed Circumstances 
The speed and frequency with which technological innovations 
impact the distribution and consumption of copyrighted works make it 
very difficult for copyright law to keep up. Section 114’s179 rate-setting 
procedure is a good example of the intractability of the process. Under 
Section 804(b), rate-setting under Section 114 entails an extensive 
notice-and-comment period causing the process to begin two years 
prior to implementation.180 Such timing makes it difficult, when not 
impossible, for the statute to respond efficiently to changes in the 
market. Indeed, the current Copyright Act was just over twenty years in 
the making, including countless negotiations between industry 
representatives, “repeated, lengthy subcommittee hearings,” 
“numerous executive sessions,” and “a flood of committee reports.”181 
Technology isn’t the only variable affecting copyright’s ability to stay 
current. Ever-evolving business models (sometimes in response to 
technological change, sometimes not) are also a factor. The evolution 
of digital business models, for example, has had a profound impact on 
who and what the law is supposed to be acting upon. In the case of 
digital music, the shift from a business model focused on selling a 
product — namely, digital downloads (e.g., Apple’s iTunes music 
service) — to selling a service — namely, curated streaming (e.g., 
Spotify) — took place over a remarkably short period of time,182 and 
 
 179 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018). 
 180 See id. § 804(b) (detailing how and when royalty rates are set). 
 181 Litman, Compromise, supra note 164, at 871.  
 182 Apple’s iTunes launched in 2001. See, e.g., Kirk McElhearn, 15 Years of iTunes: A 
Look at Apple’s Media App and its Influence on an Industry, MACWORLD (Jan. 9, 2016, 3:00 
AM PST), https://www.macworld.com/article/3019878/15-years-of-itunes-a-look-at-
apples-media-app-and-its-influence-on-an-industry.html [https://perma.cc/43AL-7H76]. 
A mere seven years later, in 2008, Spotify launched in Sweden. Company Info, SPOTIFY, 
https://newsroom.spotify.com/company-info/ (last visited Jul. 7, 2020) [https://perma. 
cc/78XL-6DHD]. 
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enjoys a remarkably large share of the music-consuming market.183 The 
same shift can be seen in the film and television industries — in which 
the focus moved from selling DVDs to selling streaming subscriptions 
(to Hulu, to Netflix, to HBOGo, to Disney+, etc.) — and in video games 
— in which many developers are no longer selling physical or digital 
games, but instead are selling a storefront of in-game purchases.184 
Changes in, or clarification of, copyright law is another explanation 
for changes in rightsholders’ attitude toward prospective infringement. 
This is especially true for uses that might qualify as fair uses. A possible 
explanation, then, for Warp’s differential treatment of the Aphex Twin 
fan video is that Warp’s counsel read the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision 
in Lenz v. Universal, which held that the Section 512 Safe Harbor 
“requires copyright holders to consider whether the potentially 
infringing material is a fair use of a copyright under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 before issuing a takedown notification.”185 
In all of these instances, the rightsholders are no longer conferring 
ownership over a piece of content, but rather a license to access that 
content. Unlike the sale of a single CD, or a single MP3, the sale of a 
streaming subscription is a revenue source that keeps on giving. It also 
largely obviates the practical import (and consumer protections) of the 
first sale doctrine, as exemplified by the recent ReDigi litigation, in 
which the rightsholder argued, among other things, that the first sale 
doctrine didn’t apply to MP3s, but only to physical goods.186 
Unfortunately, the law is not the only Johnny-come-lately in this 
scenario. Consumers have also occasionally found themselves ill-
informed regarding the ramifications of the replacement of physical (or 
 
 183 According to the RIAA’s Mid-Year 2019 Revenue Report, streaming revenues 
made up 80% of total revenues from recorded music. RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N AM., MID-
YEAR 2019 RIAA MUSIC REVENUES REPORT (2019), https://www.riaa.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/Mid-Year-2019-RIAA-Music-Revenues-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BJ5P-LLQV].  
 184 See Kuchera, supra note 105.  
 185 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 186 While the district court agreed, the Second Circuit punted on this issue, finding 
“[t]he district court found that resales through ReDigi were infringing for two reasons. 
The first reason was that, in the course of ReDigi’s transfer, the phonorecord has been 
reproduced in a manner that violates the Plaintiffs’ exclusive control of reproduction 
under § 106(1); the second was that the digital files sold through ReDigi, being unlawful 
reproductions, are not subject to the resale right established by § 109(a), which applies 
solely to a ‘particular . . . phonorecord . . . lawfully made.’ 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). We agree 
with the first reason underlying the district court’s finding of infringement. As that is a 
sufficient reason for affirmance of the judgment, we make no ruling on the district 
court’s second reason.” Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 656 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
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digital) sales with a licensing business model. The controversy over 
Amazon’s and Apple’s use of “Buy Now” buttons (when in fact, nothing 
but temporary file access is being sold) is another example of this 
mismatch.187  
The inability of copyright law to respond in real time to changes in 
technology and consumer preferences can lead to a situation in which 
some rightsholders can do better by rejecting certain statutory 
protections, such as that against infringement. In short, “[a]n 
intellectual property owner can use a myriad of alternative business 
models to extract value from the free distribution of intellectual 
property.”188 
D. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Ultimately, a rightsholder’s decision whether or not to pursue a claim 
for copyright infringement is a cost-benefit analysis. Systems that 
monitor for possible copyright infringement are expensive; YouTube’s 
Content ID system, for example, cost over $100 million to develop189 
— a reasonable sum for YouTube, perhaps, but not for a fledgling start-
up. The fact that YouTube nonetheless proceeded with the design and 
build out of a system to replace Section 512’s transaction cost savings 
points unequivocally to an analysis in which the benefit (in this case, of 
prospectively infringing — and popular — videos around which 
advertising can be served) outweighs the cost.190  
Litigation is also expensive. Given the subjectivity of the fair use 
standard, suing for copyright infringement can be particularly uncertain 
 
 187 See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy 
Now, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 317 (2017) (presenting the “results of the first study of the 
impact of marketing language like the Buy Now button on the beliefs and behavior of 
digital media consumers”).  
 188 Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why 
Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 24 
(1997).  
 189 Paul Sawers, YouTube: We’ve Invested $100 Million in Content ID and Paid over $3 
Billion to Rightsholders, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 7, 2018, 3:48 AM), https://venturebeat. 
com/2018/11/07/youtube-weve-invested-100-million-in-content-id-and-paid-over-3-
billion-to-rightsholders/ [https://perma.cc/27CY-BV3C]. 
 190 Justin Hughes has suggested an alternative interpretation for the development of 
Content ID: targeted advertising. As summarized in Sag, Safe Harbors, supra note 93, at 
541: “Targeted advertising is based on a variety of user characteristics, but to the extent 
that YouTube based its targeting on who watches what, it would be hard to then 
disclaim knowledge of the same.”  
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and unpredictable.191 Some rightsholders refrain from seeking relief for 
copyright infringement in a court of law, and instead may resort to 
various (and often successful) self-help tactics that cost less and 
promise a more reliable result.192 Or, as with the case studies in Part I 
supra, may elect to refrain from enforcement altogether.193  
In addition, and depending on the defendant, the ultimate payoff (if 
successful) may not really pay off. In the 2008 copyright infringement 
suit brought by the RIAA against file-sharer Jammie Thomas, for 
 
 191 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.1, at 12:3 (3d ed. 2005) 
(“[N]o copyright doctrine is less determinate than fair use.”); Michael W. Carroll, 
Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1095 (2007) (noting that “the fair use doctrine 
produces significant ex ante uncertainty”); Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 574-78 (2008) (proposing that fair use’s multifactor test 
makes it “notoriously difficult” to accurately predict the outcomes of an infringement 
suit). But see Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 79-85 (2012) 
(challenging the conventional view that “fair use adjudication is blighted by 
unpredictability and doctrinal incoherence”); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair 
Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2570 (2009) (suggesting that when users are “careful 
about how much they take from copyrighted works in relation to their purpose . . . 
productive uses are likely to be fair”). Notwithstanding these findings to the contrary, 
the popular notion of risk and the norm of risk-avoidance are still prominent. See, e.g., 
Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter, Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair 
Licensing, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 53, 69-71 (2014) (determining that the risk of very high 
statutory damages in copyright reinforces a norm of “if in doubt, leave it out”). In a new 
project, Justin Hughes proposes an alternate explanation for why some commentators 
can’t agree as to fair use’s predictability; namely: “When commentators talk about fair 
use being ‘stable [and] predictable,’ they are thinking of the fact patterns that are now 
handled under de facto rules already generated off §107; in those cases, the prior 
decisions are actually more important than the statutory fair use factors. When 
commentators speak of fair use being an unpredictable crap shoot, they are thinking of 
new fact patterns that have not yet been subsumed under a de facto rule and thereby 
require direct application of the §107 fair use standard.” Justin Hughes, The Sub Rosa 
Rules of Copyright Fair Use, 34 HARVARD J.L. TECH (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5). 
 192 See Amy Adler & Jeanne C. Fromer, Taking Intellectual Property into Their Own 
Hands, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1455, 1458-59 (2019) (describing how various rightsholders 
use self-help techniques to achieve most of the benefits they might through litigation, 
but at lower cost and with more certain outcome).  
 193 The newly-proposed copyright small claims act, if ultimately signed into law, 
might reduce this cost, for better or for worse. The Copyright in Small-Claims 
Enforcement Act of 2019 (“CASE Act”), S.1273 (2019). For more on the potential 
benefits and drawbacks of a copyright small claims court, see, for example, Pamela 
Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About a Proposed Copyright Small 
Claims Tribunal, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 689 (2018) (outlining scholarly concerns with 
the proposed implementation of a small claims procedure for copyright). Cf. Kevin 
Madigan, CASE Act Set to Empower Creators and Impose Accountability, CTR. FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2018/04/02/case-act-
set-to-empower-creators-and-impose-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/2BQQ-395X] 
(arguing in favor of the CASE Act’s implementation). 
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example, an initial verdict of $1.92 million in favor of plaintiffs was 
eventually reduced to $222,000, and affirmed by the Eight Circuit.194 
This was after defendant Thomas rejected the RIAA’s settlement offer of 
$25,000.195 As of this writing, the RIAA has received no payment from 
Ms. Thomas, who has publicly stated: “As I’ve said from the beginning, 
I do not have now, nor do I anticipate in the future, having $220,000 to 
pay this . . . If they do decide to try and collect, I will file for bankruptcy 
as I have no other option . . . it is what it is.”196 
When faced with these prospective costs, and relatively small upside, 
the benefits of monetizing infringement — be it in the form of revenue, 
cost savings, or valuable promotion — may win out for some 
rightsholders.  
E. Enforcement Authority 
Of the three branches of intellectual property — patent, trademark, 
and copyright — copyright is the only one that affords a rightsholder 
protection in the absence of any affirmative act requesting or confirming 
that such protection is desired. Unlike a patent, which must be applied 
for and granted,197 the mere fixation of an expression in a tangible 
medium results in a copyright.198 Unlike trademark registration, which 
requires use of the protected mark in commerce and renewal every ten 
years,199 copyright law affords the same protection to both exploited and 
unexploited works.200 Since 1989, when the United States signed onto 
the Berne Convention, registration is not even required.201 As such, a 
copyright that only the rightsholder knows about — but that anyone 
could potentially infringe — is entirely (and inexplicably) possible.  
 
 194 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 910 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(affirming reduced award); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 
1227 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 195 See David Kravets, Settlement Rejected in ‘Shocking’ RIAA File Sharing Verdict, 
WIRED (Jan. 27, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/01/settlement-rejected-
in-shocking-riaa-file-sharing-verdict/ [https://perma.cc/DG78-RX9H].  
 196 David Kravets, Supreme Court OKs $222K Verdict for Sharing 24 Songs, WIRED 
(Mar. 18, 2013, 11:58 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/scotus-jammie-thomas-
rasset/ [https://perma.cc/8S27-UDX5].  
 197 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-157 (2018). 
 198 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).  
 199 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018).  
 200 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-104 (2018). 
 201 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 
Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
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As a form of property, copyright enjoys what Tim Wu has called an 
“ex post notice right,” or an “opt-in right;” that is, “rights that require 
action after trespass to create liability — absent complaint, there is no 
wrong committed.”202 Ian Ayres has termed these kinds of rights “dual-
chooser” rights, since they require action by both parties (i.e., the 
infringer must infringe, and the infringed must bring an action for 
enforcement against the infringer).203 It is the enforcement authority 
vested with the rightsholder — or, the “ex post notice” — that affords 
copyright owners the unique opportunity to decline to enforce, and to 
opt to monetize infringement instead. For example, in his work on 
network effects in software, Ariel Katz has described the decision not to 
protect software as a “conscious business profit-maximizing 
strategy.”204  
Importantly, the option to monetize infringement impacts, in some 
cases at least, the analysis of secondary liability for copyright 
infringement. Content ID is a good example of this dynamic: In utilizing 
the ad revenue-claiming system, rightsholders effectively license in real-
time what might otherwise qualify as infringement of their copyrighted 
work, thereby excusing the intermediary — in this case, YouTube — 
from secondary liability, and/or from implication as an inducer.  
F. Norm Heterogeneity 
A final impetus for monetized infringement is at once obvious and 
subtle: As a community, rightsholders do not have a consensus view 
when it comes to infringement norms. In a forthcoming piece, Brian 
Frye makes a similar observation with regard to plagiarism in academia:  
Gradually, different social groups settled on different sets of 
plagiarism norms. But the norms were always fluid, changing in 
response to social and economic circumstances. For example, 
journalistic plagiarism norms were quite minimal in the early 
19th century, but became much more rigid as competition 
increased in the late 19th century. Initially, copying was 
encouraged. Newspapers mailed copies to each other, and 
editors used scissors to compose newspapers under their own 
byline. But later, as newspapers consolidated and information 
 
 202 Wu, supra note 24, at 6. 
 203 IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS Chs. 3-4 (Univ. 
of Chi. Press 2005).  
 204 Ariel Katz, A Network Effects Perspective on Software Piracy, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 
155, 156 (2005). 
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became more valuable, editors began to demand attribution and 
object to copying.  
Similarly, novelists and playwrights expected and demanded 
more and broader protection as their works became increasingly 
valuable. They wanted to prevent competition, by any means 
necessary. Where unattributed copying had once been the 
norm, plagiarism norms began to emerge.205 
The evolving and variable norms that Frye describes in the plagiarism 
context are observable in the copyright context as well. As a novel 
threat, piracy was initially viewed as bad not only because it was illegal 
(i.e., against copyright law), but because game developers, for example, 
found themselves losing money and didn’t like it (i.e., found their norm 
against unpaid use violated).206 Gradually, different game developers 
settled on different sets of infringement norms, changing in response to 
social and economic circumstances: Where an anti-piracy stance had 
once been the norm, a pro-piracy stance began to emerge for some 
vendors.207  
The different perspectives pertaining to copying and use can also be 
at least partially explained by generational shifts in norms around 
unauthorized use. For artists and intermediaries who grew up in the age 
of the Internet, some uses that were formerly disallowed may have come 
to be accepted, or normalized, as part of the cultural expectation. This 
is also true from the users’ perspective.  
From the perspective of copyright’s policy goals, the rule against 
infringement is explained as protecting authors’ incentives to create. But 
recording artist Khalid has made clear he isn’t harmed by WayV’s fan 
video.208 CEO Rami Ismail has made clear that game developer Vambeer 
would rather consumers pirate their games than deal in gray market 
keys.209 For these and similarly minded rightsholders, then, this 
traditional justification is tenuous at best. Put simply, not all 
 
 205 Brian L. Frye, Plagiarize This Paper, 60 IDEA: IP L. REV. 294, 303 (2020). 
 206 Or at least, believed themselves to be losing money. There is a long-running 
debate in the space as to whether those who pirate (a game, a film, a CD, etc.) would 
otherwise become paying customers, or rather would simply be non-customers. The 
most likely answer is, of course, “it depends,” but in any case, the translation is almost 
certainly not one-to-one. 
 207 Although he would explicitly not require it, my browbeaten adherence to 
academic norms of plagiarism obligate me to note that this sentence was intentionally 
plagiarized/paraphrased from Frye’s work, supra note 205, at 303. 
 208 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a. 
 209 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
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rightsholders are anti-infringement. Copyright law’s assumption that 
they are can lead to a mismatch between rule and reality. 
III. MONETIZING INFRINGEMENT AS PRIVATE POLICYMAKING 
Having explained why rightsholders might opt to monetize, rather 
than counter, infringement, this Part considers whether private 
monetization of infringement is normatively desirable, and discusses 
the implications of private policymaking through nonenforcement, a 
counterintuitive — but not so unusual — phenomenon. The following 
subparts consider the possible benefits and concerns stemming from 
monetized infringement, as well as what role, if any, the government 
plays or should play. 
A. Prospective Benefits 
A rightsholder’s decision to monetize infringement of their 
copyrighted work is effectively a decision to opt out of copyright’s 
statutory protection on a one-off basis — vis-à-vis a particular user, for 
a particular use, at a particular time. This makes the monetization of 
infringement a form of private ordering in which the parties substitute 
a private preference for infringement over copyright’s preference against 
it. As such, many of the benefits enjoyed by rightsholders who monetize 
infringement of their works mirror those enjoyed by any party who opts 
out of a statutory regime in favor of private ordering. As discussed in 
the sections infra, these include improved efficiency and tailoring. For 
its part, the government also benefits from better information-sharing. 
1. Efficiency 
In an unfortunate twist, copyright infringement suits often pit artists 
against their fans (who are sometimes artists themselves).210 While it 
may be argued that with fans like that, rightsholders don’t need 
enemies, the reality is that infringement is variable — in impetus, in 
impact, in intent, and in effect. Nonetheless, copyright law doesn’t 
differentiate beyond willful and non-willful infringement,211 a 
distinction that is rarely determinative of whether a particular instance 
 
 210 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (involving an infringement claim brought by the author of Harry Potter, J.K. 
Rowling, and her publishing company against a fan who created and published an 
online encyclopedia for the series). 
 211 NB: Statutory damages are potentially higher for willful infringers. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504 (2018). 
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of infringement is efficient. For example, the film student who made a 
fan vid for Crystal Castles’ “Plague” did so willfully; it was his thesis 
project.212 He also did so without pay. The video was very popular — as 
of this writing, it has over 40,000 views.213 As a result, the rightsholders 
received valuable promotion at no cost to them. In addition, they saved 
whatever time and money they may have spent on an infringement suit 
with an uncertain outcome.  
To the extent music consumption is a repeat-player game, they also 
avoided alienating a loyal fan, and so retained the possibility of future 
earnings from that party. From a private efficiency perspective, it was 
perfectly reasonable for Crystal Castles’ manager to reach out to the fan 
— not to sue him, but to ask him to let them use his video 
promotionally. Importantly, Crystal Castles might not make this same 
decision in the case of, say, a lyric video (commonly understood as a 
near-perfect substitute for paid streaming). There, it might make more 
sense to sue for infringement, or, more likely, to issue a takedown notice 
or to claim revenues against it. In this way, monetized infringement 
functions as a means of differentiating value among different users and 
different uses.  
As with other forms of private ordering, monetized infringement may 
also allow for greater overall efficiency since individual rightsholders 
have better, more accurate information about their respective 
tolerances, priorities, and resources than the legislature. As such, 
rightsholders who opt not to enforce against potential infringers can 
behave more nimbly and flexibly in the face of changing market 
conditions, new business models, and idiosyncratic circumstances. We 
might even view Congress’s delegation of enforcement authority to 
private copyright holders as a de facto delegation of power to the party 
with the most information, who is therefore presumed to be in the best 
position to act efficiently. After all, private rightsholders have more 
information about themselves than Congress does. Any attempt by 
Congress to gather this information and act upon it is costly — far more 
costly than simply leaving it to the relevant rightsholders.  
As an added bonus, each time a rightsholder opts to forbear from 
enforcement against — or even, as in these examples, to actively 
monetize — infringement, it reduces litigation clutter, a common 
problem in copyright.214 The propensity for litigation clutter in 
copyright stems, in large part, from how terribly long infringement 
 
 212 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.  
 213 Grbin, supra note 121.  
 214 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1873, 
1929-30 (2018) (discussing the phenomenon in the fair use context). 
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litigation takes. In order to sue for infringement, a rightsholder must 
have a registered copyright.215 Since 1989, however, registration with 
the copyright office is not required in order to obtain a copyright.216 
Prior to 2018, there was a circuit split as to whether a rightsholder 
necessarily had to have a registration in hand before filing an 
infringement suit, or whether they could file for registration 
simultaneously with filing suit.217 In Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. 
v. Wall-Street.com, the Supreme Court held that a rightsholder cannot 
file an infringement suit until after their work has been registered with, 
and approved by, the U.S. Copyright Office.218 Under current 
conditions, this can take an average of three to nine months or more.219 
Expedited registration shortens that to a few weeks, but currently costs 
$800 (versus the standard registration fee of $35), 220 a sum not readily 
available to all rightsholders. This cost and delay can be avoided, of 
course, by simply not pursuing an infringement claim in the first place.  
Finally, the ability of rightsholders to monetize certain forms of 
infringement may ameliorate some of the concerns raised by copyright’s 
lengthy term of protection. For example, some commentators have 
lamented the lack of a supporting cost-benefit analysis.221 Others have 
 
 215 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018). 
 216 See Berne Convention, supra note 201. 
 217 Compare Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 
1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding registration completed under 17 U.S.C. 411(a) 
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Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding registration 
completed under 17 U.S.C. 114(a) when the claimant’s “complete application” is 
received by the Copyright Office). 
 218 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888 
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 219 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REGISTRATION PROCESSING TIMES 1, https://www.copyright. 
gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
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additional background and examples of the impact litigation delay can have, see, for 
example, Scott Alan Burroughs, Copyright Litigation: Now More Expensive and with More 
Delay Than Ever Before!, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:14 AM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2019/03/copyright-litigation-now-more-expensive-and-with-
more-delay-than-ever-before/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/E6C7-PT7R].  
 221 See, e.g., Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 3, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846 (“Taken 
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discussed the inefficiency borne of an overly long period of protection, 
including the proliferation of market entry of questionable value.222 As 
a form of one-off “licensing,” the monetization of infringement helps to 
mitigate these concerns as rightsholders and prospective users move 
toward a more efficient distribution.  
2. Tailoring 
Under a statutory regime like copyright, licensees pay the same rate 
for use of the same content, regardless of the (admittedly subjective) 
quality of the particular content and the circumstances of its use. Under 
Section 114, for example, a stream of Wu-Tang Clan’s C.R.E.A.M.223 
earns the same royalty as a stream of Desiigner’s Panda.224 This heretical 
outcome225 is the result of Section 114’s one-size-fits-all nature — one 
ill-suited for many works and uses. The option to monetize 
infringement, on the other hand, allows a rightsholder to tailor their 
enforcement decision to a particular piece of content, to a particular 
user, and/or to a particular use. This arguably leads to the production 
and distribution of content deemed valuable by the market — such as 
certain high promotional value fan vids — while continuing to curb the 
production and distribution of content deemed undesirable by the 
market — such as low-quality streaming-substitute lyric videos. As a 
doctrine, copyright infringement fails to make this important 
distinction; unauthorized use is unauthorized use regardless of value. 
By allowing tailoring in accordance with benefit, monetizing 
infringement improves upon the statutory option to sue. 
Another potential benefit of tailoring is that it may allow for greater 
use of content than would otherwise be permissible under the statutory 
regime. Instead of only one official music video for Danny Brown’s 
Grown Up, for example, YouTube currently hosts nine such videos (one 
 
as a whole, it is highly unlikely that the economic benefits from copyright [term] 
extension . . . outweigh the additional costs.”). 
 222 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A New Uneasy Case for Copyright, 79 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1644, 1680 (2011) (“Though [even stronger copyright protection] would 
maximize the production of works, rent dissipation theory indicates that the marginal 
works produced might be of little or negative social value . . . .”). 
 223 WU-TANG CLAN, C.R.E.A.M. (Loud Records 1993). 
 224 DESIIGNER, PANDA, (Menace 2015).  
 225 Unlike the inherent subjectivity involved in most judgments of musical quality, 
this determination is ironclad, and the author will not accept opinions to the contrary 
(also known as “wrong opinions”). 
  
320 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:265 
official, and a variety of fan videos and remixes).226 To the extent 
copyright is concerned with incentivizing creation, leaving the 
enforcement decision to rightsholders who may opt instead to monetize 
infringement is one way to accomplish that goal.227  
3. Information 
In contract law, a penalty default is an unpalatable fallback option 
that kicks in unless the parties to the contract negotiate otherwise.228 
One of the advantages afforded by the existence of a penalty default is 
that it can induce the parties — who are each most knowledgeable about 
their respective situations, but generally (and certainly relatively) 
ignorant as the counterparty’s — to “reveal information by contracting 
around the default penalty.”229 For example, where a contractual default 
leads to an undesirable result for Party A (possessor of information 
unknown to Party B), Party A may be incentivized to negotiate around 
the default, thereby revealing their (formerly private) information. 
Importantly, Party A reveals this information not only to Party B, but 
also to the government, which in turn can use that information to draft 
not just better laws, but also to make better enforcement decisions. 
Consider, for example, the case of the federal government’s shutdown 
and seizure of the torrent site Megaupload. According to the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Megaupload boasted “more than one 
billion visits to the site, more than 150 million registered users, 50 
million daily visitors and account[ed] for four percent of the total traffic 
on the Internet. The estimated harm caused by the conspiracy’s criminal 
conduct to copyright holders is well in excess of $500 million. The 
conspirators allegedly earned more than $175 million in illegal profits 
 
 226 Online search for YouTube Danny Brown’s Grown Up, www.google.com (Jan. 10, 
2020). 
 227 This is not intended as a statement on the quality of the incentivized creation, 
nor the desirability of more content over less. Some scholars have argued persuasively 
that this follow-on creation may actually be inefficient insofar as we might encourage 
creators to produce superfluous works very similar to existing works, where that effort 
might be better invested elsewhere. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial 
Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 33 (2004) (finding 
that increasing copyrighted material does not necessarily create variety); Christopher S. 
Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
635 (2007) (arguing less content shows consumer disinterest).  
 228 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).  
 229 Id. at 94. 
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through advertising revenue and selling premium memberships.”230 
Using its authority under Section 506,231 the government seized the site, 
and has been trying to get New Zealand to extradite its founders — 
including principal Kim Dotcom — ever since.232 This decision was 
made with the robust and unanimous support of such major content 
representatives as the RIAA and the MPAA, each of whom also filed 
separate civil lawsuits against the torrent site.233 The fact that small-and 
medium-budget films sometimes encourage piracy of their films as a 
form of marketing that they can’t otherwise afford,234 however, suggests 
that not all rightsholders are the same. It is unclear whether possession 
of this information on the infringement preferences of smaller budget 
films would have changed the government’s position on Megaupload, 
but it may have. For example, the DOJ might have decided to allow 
impacted content owners to opt into (or out of) a settlement instead. 
The music and publishing industries’ partial abandonment of DRM 
for physical CDs and some e-books235 is another example of information 
revealed by private non-enforcement of the right against infringement. 
Section 512(i)(1)(B) conditions an intermediary’s protection from 
secondary liability on its agreement not to interfere with “standard 
technical measures,”236 defined in Section 512(i)(2) as  
[T]echnical measures that are used by copyright owners to 
identify or protect copyrighted works and (A) have been 
developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners 
and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry 
standards process; (B) are available to any person on reasonable 
 
 230 Justice Department Charges Leaders with Widespread Online Copyright Infringement, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
charges-leaders-megaupload-widespread-online-copyright-infringement [https://perma.cc/ 
GA5S-KLVS]; see also Superseding Indictment of Megaupload at 2, United States v. Dotcom, 
No. 1:12CR3, 2012 WL 4788433 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2012). 
 231 17 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C) (2018). 
 232 The latest appeal was filed by defendants in June 2019. See Nick Perry, Kim 
Dotcom Fights US Extradition in New Zealand’s Top Court, AP NEWS (June 10, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/e086e013950143dea8e0ed8e7b0f3b7d [https://perma.cc/FNN4-
2FGC].  
 233 See, e.g., Stuart Dredge, Kim Dotcom and Megaupload Sued for Copyright 
Infringement by Music Labels, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2014/apr/11/riaa-mpaa-megaupload-kim-dotcom-piracy-lawsuits 
[https://perma.cc/TF69-RT26] (noting that the RIAA and MPAA filed lawsuits against 
Megaupload).  
 234 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.b. 
 235 But not, notably, for streaming or digital book lending by libraries. 
 236 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2018).  
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and nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose 
substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on 
their systems or networks.237  
While DVD DRM is technically the only system implemented 
“pursuant to a broad consensus,” the DRM measures implemented on 
other formats is often considered under this same standard. Record 
labels began abandoning DRM in 2007.238 E-publishers and e-book 
platforms, like Amazon’s Kindle, have followed suit, openly declining 
to track how many devices a purchased e-book is transferred 
between.239 To some extent, the move away from technical protection 
measures is a reflection of changes in technology that have made these 
systems increasingly easy to circumvent.240 This information might 
allow lawmakers to update the legislative framework in light of 
changing circumstances. In this example, legislators looking to improve 
the efficiency of copyright law might remove the condition in 512(i), 
thereby setting an assumption of no DRM as the default, and allowing 
private parties to negotiate for such protections when and where they 
find them useful.  
B. Potential Concerns 
The preceding subpart outlined some of the ways that infringement 
can be better — for rightsholders, for users, for society, and for the 
legislature — than non-infringement. Unfortunately, with these 
benefits also comes various opportunities for gamesmanship, as this 
subpart describes. 
 
 237 Id. § 512(i)(2).  
 238 Only to see their sales increase. See, e.g., Freek Vermeulen, How Removing Copy 




 239 See Bruner, supra note 152.  
 240 In the Seventh Triennial Rulemaking on Exemptions Granted in Section 1201, 
online video games were brought under the exemption for the first time, though more 
narrowly than petitioners had hoped. This is because, interestingly, video game 
developers argued DRM was still vital in that particular market. For a summary of the 
arguments, see Keton Hansrajh, The Expanded DMCA Exemption for Video Game 
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1. Anticompetitiveness 
As with other forms of private ordering, the option to monetize 
infringement may favor larger, more powerful rightsholders and 
platforms. As HBO’s highest-ever grossing franchise,241 HBO’s Game of 
Thrones can afford to boast of being the “most torrented.”242 A fledgling 
Netflix series that ends up canceled for lack of paying viewership, 
however, cannot.  
Moreover, because the enforcement decision is made on a one-off 
basis, a rightsholder could use the option to favor certain infringers over 
others, whether intentionally or unintentionally. For example, a fan 
might see Khalid’s tweet praising and promoting WayV’s fan vid of 
“lovely”243 and be induced to spend time and money producing their 
own video for the track, only to find it taken down or blocked by the 
record label.  
If that result seems like a case of “ah, well, that’s the risk one takes,” 
consider what happens when we move to a vertically integrated 
example: Television streaming service Hulu is wholly owned by 
Disney.244 Disney owns tens of thousands of television and film 
properties,245 and also operates several platforms via which they are 
distributed.246 Subscribers to Hulu (both ad-free and with ads) may 
download the Hulu app to as many devices as they like, but may only 
stream simultaneously on any two devices.247 Hulu competes directly 
with, among other parties, streaming service Netflix. In an effort to 
 
 241 A title formerly held by The Sopranos. See Deborah Dsouza, The Success of Game 
of Thrones in 5 Charts, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ 
the-success-of-hbo-s-game-of-thrones-in-charts-4684966 [https://perma.cc/M3DM-
QZMZ].  
 242 See, e.g., Holly Brockwell, Game of Thrones Takes Most-Torrented TV for 7th Year 
Running, GIZMODO (Jan. 2, 2020, 2:30 AM), https://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2020/01/game-
of-thrones-most-torrented-tv/ [https://perma.cc/GV87-2M26]. 
 243 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.  
 244 See Mike Snider, Disney Takes over Hulu. What’s It Mean for Cord Cutters, Binge 
Watchers? Change Is Coming, USA TODAY (May 14, 2019, 3:08 PM ET), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/05/14/disney-bought-hulu-whats-
mean-cord-cutters-binge-watchers/3665629002/ [https://perma.cc/6TNF-4689].  
 245 See Emily Todd VanDerWerff, Here’s What Disney Owns After the Massive 
Disney/Fox Merger, VOX (Mar. 20, 2019, 1:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/culture/ 
2019/3/20/18273477/disney-fox-merger-deal-details-marvel-x-men [https://perma.cc/ 
P3JW-W3NM].  
 246 See, e.g., Homepage, DISNEY+, https://www.disneyplus.com (last visited Jan. 11, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/L6XF-H9X4] (advertising Disney’s other platforms). 
 247 How Many Screens Can I Watch Hulu on at the Same Time?, HULU (May 27, 2020), 
https://help.hulu.com/s/article/streams?language=en_US [https://perma.cc/KQE2-964P]. 
An “unlimited screens” option was recently added for an additional $9.99/month. See id. 
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attract customers away from Netflix and toward the Hulu platform, 
Hulu might decide to ignore its own two-device rule and let subscribers 
simultaneously stream on any number of devices in any number of 
locations. Once they put Netflix (and other similarly situated entities) 
out of business, they can go back to enforcing the limitation (because 
disgruntled consumers now have nowhere to go). 
The possibility of nefarious lock-in is particularly strong in the e-
commerce context. In her work on platforms and antitrust, Lina Khan 
writes that:  
Amazon, like other e-book sellers, has used a scheme known as 
[DRM], which limits the types of devices that can read certain 
e-book formats. Compelling readers to purchase a Kindle 
through cheap e-books locks them into future e-book purchases 
from Amazon. . . . It becomes unlikely that a reader will then 
purchase a Nook and switch to buying e-books through Barnes 
& Noble, even if that company is slashing prices.248  
It is not only consumers who might be harmed by the anticompetitive 
behavior of market-dominant platforms. As author Cory Doctorow 
explains: 
[I]f [my publisher] sells you one of my books for the Kindle 
locked with Amazon’s DRM, neither I, nor [my publisher], can 
authorise you to remove that DRM. If Amazon demands a 
deeper discount (something Amazon has been doing with many 
publishers as their initial ebook distribution deals come up for 
renegotiation) and [my publisher] wants to shift its preferred 
ebook retail to a competitor . . . it will have to bank on its 
readers being willing to buy their books all over again.249 
The recent litigation over application programming interfaces 
(“APIs”) in Google v. Oracle offers another example.250 In that case, 
Oracle and software developer Sun Microsystems were both members 
of the American Committee for Interoperable Systems (“ACIS”), an 
organization whose basic message was that reuse, or reimplementation, 
 
 248 Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 760-61 
(2017) (citations omitted). 
 249 Cory Doctorow, Why the Death of DRM Would Be Good News for Readers, Writers 
and Publishers, GUARDIAN (May 3, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2012/may/03/death-of-drm-good-news [https://perma.cc/94ZB-NXSQ].  
 250 Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019).  
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of APIs is not infringing.251 At the time, such a policy made sense for 
two relatively small companies working to scale up. Later, when then-
behemoth Oracle bought Sun Microsystems, they sued their competitor 
Google for doing the very thing they’d previously advocated for.252 
To the extent that a copyright is itself a “mini-monopoly,” selective 
enforcement of copyright may be used as a form of predatory pricing, 
effectively raising the barrier to entry. In their work on the subject, 
Danny Ben-Shahar and Assaf Jacob note that where antitrust law is 
sensitive to “predatory pricing or to unlawful monopolization, [an] 
incumbent may eventually reach the same result by selectively failing to 
enforce copyrights.”253 In other words, a rightsholder might monetize 
infringement as a means of maintaining their dominant position while 
skirting the antitrust laws.  
One way to mitigate the potential for anticompetitive effects 
stemming from a rightsholder’s one-off decision to monetize, rather 
than enforce their rights against, infringement might be to require that 
all similarly-situated counterparties be treated equally — both across 
partners and over time. In other words, a record label either monetizes 
fan vids (regardless of their quality or promotional value), or it doesn’t. 
Of course, this would also obviate the tailoring and efficiency benefits 
discussed in Part III.A supra.  
Another approach might be to apply a theory of estoppel to 
rightsholders who selectively monetize infringement. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “estoppel” as “[a] bar that prevents one from 
asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done 
before . . . [.]”254 Applying this to the video game developer who tells 
prospective customers to pirate a game rather than purchasing a game 
key from a reseller, the rightsholder would be estopped from later 
pursuing infringement claims against a user who does so. Similarly, a 
record label who uses Content ID to claim advertising around 99% of 
user-uploaded videos containing its copyrighted music (we can assume 
a healthy mix of both fair use and infringing use) would be estopped 
from selectively terminating its “authorization” at will. Worded 
 
 251 V. SRIDHAR, EMERGING ICT POLICIES AND REGULATIONS: ROADMAP TO DIGITAL 
ECONOMIES 95 (Springer 2019) (“American Committee for Interoperable Systems 
(ACIS) historically supported the freedom to re-implement software interfaces.”).  
 252 See, e.g., Brief of Copyright Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner 
at 16-17, Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (No. 18-956) (noting that Oracle was a member 
of ACIS when ACIS argued that reusing API is not infringing).  
 253 Danny Ben-Shahar & Assaf Jacob, A Preach for a Breach: Promoting Copyright 
Infringements as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior 3 (Aug. 2000) (Working Paper) (on 
file with author) (citations omitted). 
 254 Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
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differently, a user whose fan vids have always been simply claimed by a 
rightsholder under Content ID can be said to have a reliance claim that 
such uploads will not be taken down (or litigated against, as the case 
may be). This would retain the prospective benefits of monetized 
infringement, while giving potentially confused consumers more 
certainty. 
The recent litigation over use of copyrighted photos to create political 
memes is a good example of the estoppel argument in practice. In early 
2020, Representative Steve King used a copyrighted photo of Laney 
Marie Griner’s in a meme for use as part of King’s re-election campaign, 
something Griner has referred to as “vile” and “disgusting.”255 The 
challenge for her case against King doesn’t stem from the legion of 
legitimate licensees — including Coca-Cola, General Mills, Microsoft, 
and Marriot — but rather from the unlicensed uses of the image in 
legions of unauthorized memes.  
2. Distributional Impact 
On the one hand, the monetization of infringement can be viewed as 
a decision borne of privilege. For example, we might say that Khalid — 
whose latest album enjoyed 202,000 album-equivalent sales in its first 
week of release256 — can afford to monetize the work of creative fans 
like WayV, who only serve to add to his vast popularity, and to motivate 
his fan base. We might not say the same of a fledgling artist who finds 
herself losing precious advertising revenue to an unauthorized upload 
of her official video. Similarly, HBO’s Game of Thrones — a television 
series that has earned $2.28 billion over eight seasons257 — might be 
well-positioned to enjoy its unconventional distinction as “most pirated 
series.” The same would probably not be said of an indie film whose 
filmmaker finds herself unable to compete with the pirated copies 
flooding torrent sites. In this way, the monetization of infringement can 
 
 255 Ashley Cullins, Mom of “Success Kid” Threatens to Sue Rep. Steve King for Using 
the Meme in Fundraising Effort, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 27, 2020, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/rep-steve-king-threatened-lawsuit-use-
success-kid-meme-1273866 [https://perma.cc/65GL-LGX5]. 
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BILLBOARD (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/ 
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be seen as yet another opportunity available only to those content 
owners who are already in a privileged position.  
In addition, to the extent powerful content owners set consumer 
expectations, their enforcement decisions can bind unwilling 
competitors. For example, gamers may come to understand that piracy 
of video games is fine so long as they purchase DLC: 
 
 
An indie developer with a game that doesn’t feature DLC could then 
find itself losing sales with no potential upside. The former could be 
said to be forbearing by choice; the latter, by default. After all, bringing 
a lawsuit for copyright infringement is costly and time-consuming 
under the best of circumstances; under a flood of infringement 
monetized by larger developers, it may well prove untenable. Under this 
view, monetizing infringement worsens extant distributional justice 
concerns.  
Unlike other private ordering alternatives such as Creative Commons 
(“CC”), the phenomenon of monetizing infringement is not an across-
the-board license or permission. A work licensed under CC’s 
Attribution-NonCommercial (“CC BY-NC”) license, for example, 
allows others to “remix, adapt, and build upon your work non-
commercially, and although their new works must also acknowledge 
you and be non-commercial, they don’t have to license their derivative 
works on the same terms.”258 The terms “their” and “they” in this 
definition refer to all-comers. This is explicitly not the case in monetized 
infringement, where a rightsholder’s enforcement decision can vary 
from user to user, from use to use, and from work to work. 
On the other hand, the monetization of infringement might be viewed 
as an equalizer of sorts. The small-budget film, unable to afford much 
in the way of marketing, might encourage torrenting as a means of 
 
 258 About the Licenses, supra note 15.  
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boosting box office numbers. Likewise, a little-known niche television 
series might attract the attention of a behemoth like Netflix by 
encouraging piracy of its episodes as a means of proving viewership. On 
balance, then, the distributional effects of monetizing infringement 
might go either way, and should be kept in mind when amending 
legislation that might make the practice more or less accessible.  
3. Norm-Setting 
Consumer confusion and conflicting social norms merit further 
discussion. When a user uploads one fan vid and gets retweeted by the 
artist, then uploads another fan vid and gets a strongly worded warning 
and takedown from YouTube, it sends a mixed message: is this allowed, 
or isn’t it? Social norms play a large role in whether or not people act in 
accordance with various laws and regulations:  
To the extent that laws align with, establish, or enhance the 
operation of norms[,] compliance with laws is not solely a 
function of formal enforcement . . . And, of course, laws do 
frequently align with preexisting social norms. Though “special 
interests” certainly play a role in the formulation of social 
policy, it remains the case that laws “formulated in ways that 
are congruent with social norms are much more likely to be 
enacted than laws that offend such norms.259  
Mixed signaling from rightsholders can lead to mixed social norms, 
which in turn may reduce the application and effectiveness of the 
relevant rule — in this case, the rule against infringement.  
There is also the risk of cross-genre and cross-context confusion. An 
example of the former is an avid gamer, accustomed to the norm that 
games can be pirated so long as you make in-game purchases, who 
might reasonably assume that they can pirate a film (perhaps in order 
to peek and see if it’s worth seeing in theaters, or perhaps just to avoid 
paying altogether). An example of the latter is a Hulu subscriber who 
currently shares a login with eight of their roommates, and is surprised 
to find that Hulu’s sister service, Disney+, locks after two devices. 
Because consumers are highly unlikely to know what is in a company’s 
terms of service,260 Disney+ may even end up expending customer 
 
 259 David E. DePianto, Sticky Compliance: An Endowment Account of Expressive Law, 
2014 UTAH L. REV. 327, 338 (citing Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, 
Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 157, 159 (2000)). 
 260 See, e.g., Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service 
Agreements, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider. 
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service time (and money) responding to indignant (albeit misinformed) 
consumers.  
In his work on “shallow signals,” Bert Huang uses copyright as an 
example of a “private permission” that might mislead as to the legality 
of UGC: 
You see one of today’s hit songs being played in dozens of 
homemade videos posted on YouTube. Feeling confident that 
there is little risk of copyright enforcement, you decide to use a 
different hit song in your own video. What you don’t realize, 
however, is that the first hit song happened to be covered by a 
blanket license arranged by YouTube itself with that specific 
radio label.261 
Incomplete information and a lack of sophistication on the part of the 
emulator can lead to unintended illegality. Of course, in the case of 
copyright infringement — a strict liability offense — the actor’s lack of 
intent is of no consequence. 
One possible solution has been suggested by Michael Carroll in the 
context of fair use. He proposes a “Fair Use Board” in the Copyright 
Office that would rule on fair use petitions, effectively issuing “no-
action” letters (with a favorable ruling) that would immunize the user 
from prosecution for copyright infringement.262 Tim Wu has similarly 
proposed a “Copyright No Action” policy:  
Here the idea is that owners of copyrighted works, to the degree 
that they accept and want to encourage limited usage of their 
works, can declare so to the world, allowing them to focus on 
only the most economically significant infringements while 
increasing the certainty of those who might want to use the 
works. They can do so using a “no action policy,” which would 
describe those uses of the works that the owner will not 
enforce.263  
This would not obviate all of the concerns stemming from selective 
enforcement and monetization, but it might mitigate user confusion (to 
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In their work on user privileges in copyright, Gideon Parchomovsky 
and Phil Weiser present an alternate, two-stage mechanism:  
In the first stage, Congress would require all owners and 
distributors of digital content to endorse a set of user privileges 
without decreeing the specific content of those privileges. In 
addition, Congress would require content owners to state 
clearly what user privileges their terms of use would afford and 
would empower the FTC to oversee compliance. If, and only if, 
these measures fail to yield a desirable level of accommodation, 
Congress would move to the second stage and increase the 
regulatory burden on content owners by specifying, based on 
the measures adopted in stage one, the precise content of the 
privileges that content owners must adopt.264 
This approach — if extended beyond the fair use context — may best 
serve the goal of (i) taking advantage of many of the benefits stemming 
from private ordering, such as tailoring and information-forcing; while 
(ii) mitigating some of the concerns resulting from monetizing 
infringement, such as inaccurate norm-setting and anticompetitive 
enforcement.  
4. Transparency & Accountability 
One indisputable drawback of an enforcement decision made by a 
private party is a lack of transparency. We can speculate as to the 
impetuses that have led record labels to embrace some fan vids and shun 
others, for example, but we don’t have any confirmed takeaways or 
hard-and-fast “rules” as to how to make a fan vid that will evade an 
infringement charge and instead be embraced as a monetization 
opportunity. This uncertainty can lead to “inefficiency and 
gamesmanship.”265  
Another potential downside to the private monetization of copyright 
infringement is that it may override congressional intent.266 In 
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establishing exclusive rights for copyright holders in Section 106,267 and 
in giving them remedies for infringement, the legislature determined 
infringement to be undesirable, inefficient, and counterproductive for 
copyright’s goal of incentivizing creation. The private monetization of 
infringement arguably contradicts the congressional prescription,268 
and thereby arguably diminishes the strength of copyright’s protection 
for all rightsholders. The fact that most rightsholders monetize 
infringing (and potentially infringing) user-generated videos to upload 
to YouTube sets a norm — right or wrong — that posting a video using 
someone else’s content is fine, so long as you relinquish your right to 
any advertising revenues. This norm is imposed on all rightsholders, 
including those who disagree — they can opt to takedown, but these 
isolated takedowns are largely ineffective, and cannot hope to stem the 
tide of uploads.269  
Considered en masse, the monetization of infringement can amount 
to unilateral policymaking. Take for instance the example of several 
large video game developers monetizing piracy of their games by selling 
DLC to the pirates. The position of the companies controlling a majority 
market share readily becomes the position of the market. Game 
developers whose products do not make money on DLC have little to 
no power to “undo” the policy set by the other developers.  
Finally, a regime — like copyright infringement — that leaves 
enforcement to private parties allows Congress to pass laws that on their 
face appease powerful lobbyists, despite the fact that in practice, private 
forbearance renders them far less impactful. As Barron and Rakoff note 
in their work on big waiver, this can allow politicians to shirk — to look 
like they’re doing something when they’re really not, and/or to pass off 
their lawmaking responsibilities to private citizens whose preferences 
may not be representative of all affected parties.270  
 
 267 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). 
 268 I say “arguably” because as noted we might view Congress’s grant of enforcement 
authority to rightsholders as a nod of approval for private ordering of this sort. 
 269 See, e.g., Kevin Madigan, Despite What You Hear, Notice and Takedown Is Failing 
Creators and Copyright Owners, CTR. FOR PROTECTION INTELL. PROP. (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://cpip.gmu.edu/2016/08/24/despite-what-you-hear-notice-and-takedown-is-failing-
creators-and-copyright-owners/ [https://perma.cc/2CLX-4YXL] (noting, with regard to 
Taylor Swift’s album 1989, that the record label “sent over 66,000 DMCA takedown 
notices. Despite their considerable efforts, over 500,000 links to the album were 
identified, and ‘1989’ was illegally downloaded nearly 1.4 million times from torrent 
sites”).  
 270 See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 163, at 307. 
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The literature has focused primarily on copyright’s tendency to 
outsource enforcement to platforms via secondary liability.271 An 
equally concerning proposition raised by the monetization of 
infringement is the outsourcing of enforcement to rightsholders. The 
potential problem with the replacement of the state with an individual 
rightsholder is that the private party’s interests may not reflect 
Congress’s. Specifically, “private suits tend to act as a substitute for 
public enforcement rather than a complement. . . . To the extent that 
private suits take the place of public enforcement in certain sectors or 
geographic areas, the ability for private objectives to supplant public 
objectives is magnified.”272  
Moreover, delegation of enforcement to algorithms — as in the case, 
for example, of Content ID —  
[L]acks sufficient measures to ensure that online intermediaries 
are held accountable for their actions, failures, and 
wrongdoings. . . . Algorithmic enforcement mechanisms are 
nontransparent in the way they exercise discretion over 
determining copyright infringement and fair use; they afford 
insufficient opportunities to challenge the decisions they make 
while failing to adequately secure due process; and they curtail 
the possibility of correcting errors in individual determinations 
of copyright infringement by impeding the opportunity for 
public oversight.273  
In his work on “DMCA-plus” agreements such as Content ID, 
Matthew Sag emphasizes that: 
[T]he defining feature of DMCA-plus arrangements is not that 
those choices are good or bad, but rather that they are choices 
made by rightsholders and platforms--not users, or Congress, 
or even courts. Not only are these choices private, they are often 
obscure, such that it is difficult to determine from the outside 
even what choices have been made.274  
 
 271 See, e.g., John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion 
of Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1824 
(2013) (claiming that “uncertainty ‘outsources’ enforcement costs to Internet 
platforms”). 
 272 Sarah L. Stafford, Private Policing of Environmental Performance: Does It Further 
Public Goals?, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 79-80 (2012). 
 273 Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright 
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 478 (2016).  
 274 See Sag, supra note 93, at 559. 
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The monetized infringement described herein differs significantly 
from, for example, a Creative Commons license in that the latter is 
explicit, and preannounced, with prescribed terms and limits. The 
monetized infringement described herein may be explicit or implicit. It 
may be “announced” — like the game developers’ plea to prospective 
key purchasers — or it may be on a case-by-case basis—like in the case 
of fan videos. To the extent Congress delegates enforcement authority 
to rightsholders, it might consider measures to mitigate the potential 
for public-private interest misalignment, perhaps by reading implicit 
terms into such monetization thereby constraining their ability to 
revoke and/or limit use after the fact. Another option might be to read 
an implied license into the monetization of infringement, protecting at 
least parties whose use was previously monetized from being claimed 
against in the future for the same use. The next subpart details the 
government’s role further.  
C. Role of Government  
Parties will circumvent a statute and engage in private ordering when 
they can (or when they believe they can) do better — make more 
money, save more money, avoid a transaction cost like negative PR, etc. 
This requires an unpalatable statute, also known as a penalty default.275 
Where a statute is a misfit — as the copyright statute is for many works 
and uses276 — private rightsholders can (and do) engage in various 
forms of DIY tailoring, including monetizing infringement. The 
government’s role in monetizing infringement, then, is to set a baseline 
against which the private parties’ gains can be measured. In setting a 
one-size-fits-all statute that is slow to respond to technological change 
and subject to legislative capture, the legislature has established in 
copyright an ideal penalty default statute.  
To the extent this allows those for whom the statute works to operate 
under it, and those who can do better via private ordering to do so, the 
government might do best to simply set the default and then stay out of 
the way (assuming no market harm caused by the default).277 Indeed, 
 
 275 See García, Penalty Default, supra note 17. 
 276 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 277 In their seminal article on behavioral economics and the law, Cass Sunstein and 
Richard Thaler urge caution when setting governmental defaults, as they tend to be 
“sticky.” Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV 1159, 1201 (2003) (“[I]n many domains, people’s 
preferences are labile and ill-formed, and hence starting points and default rules are 
likely to be quite sticky. In these circumstances, the goal should be to avoid random, 
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copyright’s compulsory licenses may be viewed as the inevitable result 
of monetized infringement: rightsholders who have accepted the fact 
that infringement benefits them and now seek governmentally enforced 
payment.  
Notably, copyright does not have a designated agency with the 
authority to adapt or tailor the statute.278 At best, the Copyright Office 
supports the legislature through the preparation of non-binding studies 
and reports, and through the maintenance of an informational 
compendium.279 Perhaps this suggests that Congress recognized its 
limitations in this area, and so it intentionally set a penalty default that 
would encourage private ordering — in this case, the monetization of 
infringement.  
The government’s role as backstop is very important for monetized 
infringement. It allows rightsholders — such as Aphex Twin and Warp 
Records — to look like good guys when they embrace and promote a 
fan vid, while retaining the right to revert to the statute in instances of 
undesired infringement. It allows the signatories to Content ID to earn 
advertising revenues from YouTube, unless and until they decide to 
move on to another business model, at which point they can again turn 
to the statute for protection. Indeed, the very development of 
arrangements like Content ID were prompted by the threat of litigation 
stemming from the statute as backdrop: For example, Content ID was 
developed “while copyright litigation was pending against [YouTube] 
in federal court. Google launched Content ID shortly after acquiring 
 
inadvertent, arbitrary, or harmful effects and to produce a situation that is likely to 
promote people’s welfare . . . .”). 
 278 Perhaps it should. See Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1553-55 (2016) (discussing an enhanced role for a copyright 
agency). But see Jake Linford, Improving Technology Neutrality Through Compulsory 
Licensing, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 126, 142 (2016) (“For better or worse, 
Congress designated itself the institution responsible for making wholesale revisions to 
the Act . . . agencies are already empowered to shape copyright law by managing 
compulsory damage regimes and crafting exceptions to liability for circumventing 
technological protection measures or trafficking in technology that circumvents those 
measures.”).  
 279 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES § 101 (3d ed. 2017) (stating its purpose is to instruct agency staff and provide 
information); Policy Reports, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/ 
policy/policy-reports.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V8CV-3QV2] 
(providing a collection of policy reports). 
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YouTube and getting sued by Viacom and other copyright industry 
plaintiffs for billions of dollars in statutory damages.”280 
CONCLUSION 
The notion that copyright infringement is something to be mitigated 
relies upon an assumption that it necessarily harms rightsholders. The 
conventional account is that infringement always diminishes artists’ 
ability to earn a living, thereby reducing their incentive to create. In 
order to preserve creative output — and with it, a culturally robust 
society — copyright law must therefore stop infringement where it can, 
and punish it (often severely) where it cannot.  
This Essay has presented a series of case studies demonstrating just 
the opposite to be true. Infringement does not always harm 
rightsholders. Instead, they may benefit via new, more efficient business 
models, increased revenues, and lower costs. In these cases, monetizing 
infringement may lead to an improvement in overall efficiency.  
By describing the paradox of rightsholders who actively monetize 
infringement of their copyrighted work, I aim to suggest that we have a 
long way to go toward a positive theory of copyright. As we move in 
that direction, I hope to offer several major takeaways for both scholars 
and legislators. Importantly, monetized infringement demonstrates that 
rightsholders are a heterogeneous group with endogenous preferences. 
It is not only the case that one statutory license doesn’t fit all content, 
but also that one perspective of infringement as “bad” doesn’t fit all 
content owners.  
A nuanced and critical examination of infringement enforcement in 
practice should lead us to reconsider the axiomatic assumption that 
rightsholders are necessarily anti-infringement. Perhaps legislators have 
been misled by lobbyists’ doomsday scenarios that describe 
infringement and piracy as the ultimate threat to the creative industries. 
By effectively allowing for DIY tailoring, perhaps the option for 
rightsholders to privately forbear is keeping the current (otherwise, 
one-size-fits-none) regime workable. Congress might be well-served to 
consider the information that monetized infringement provides when 
amending and updating the current statute. At the very least, 
recognizing that infringement can be “good” should guide us toward a 
regime that takes into account diverse perspectives and outcomes.  
 
 280 Annemarie Bridy, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus Enforcement by Internet 
Intermediaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 14 (John A. 
Rothchild ed., 2016).  
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Finally, a theory of monetized infringement is a theory of private 
policymaking. Like governmental and administrative forbearance, 
private ordering via nonenforcement relies on a delegation of 
enforcement authority. Unlike governmental and administrative 
forbearance, private ordering via nonenforcement runs the risk of 
placing a potentially disproportionate share of power in the hands of 
already dominant players, while further disenfranchising less 
established artists, intermediaries with fewer resources, and 
traditionally marginalized communities. This possibility should be 
taken seriously by scholars and lawmakers concerned about copyright’s 
role as a driver of inequality. 
